Historical Information and Beliefs About Racial Inequality

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Abstract

Does exposure to historical information cause systemic policy thinking? Despite the importance of this question across multiple research traditions, there is a dearth of empirical research assessing it. We evaluate this question by studying the case of how arguments about the historical and structural roots of racial inequality affect beliefs about racial inequality. Analyzing data from a novel survey experiment fielded on two national, census-balanced samples of American adults, we find compelling evidence that such arguments can increase beliefs in the existence of Black-white racial inequality and increase beliefs in structural causes of racial inequality, particularly among white Republicans and Independents. In addition, we find evidence that historical information can reduce racial resentment among these groups. Overall, our study provides evidence that exposure to historical information can induce greater systemic and historical thinking about contemporary racial inequalities in the United States.

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Political theorists, historians, and racial justice activists have argued that exposure to historical information—specifically information about the historical and structural roots of contemporary racial inequalities—is necessary to perceive contemporary racial inequalities as systemic policy problems that require systemic policy solutions. Despite the ubiquity of this claim across multiple scholarly traditions, the extent to which Americans accept (or reject) historical information when making sense of contemporary racial inequality and how this information affects policy beliefs and attitudes regarding racial inequality are questions that are not well-understood empirically.[1]

Understanding this question empirically has become increasingly important as the United States becomes increasingly polarized and sorted along racial lines. Scholars have documented how overlapping partisan and social identities have become mutually reinforcing in a way that can amplify out-group animus (Mason, 2018), induce ideological and racial motivated reasoning (e.g., Morin-Chasse, Suhay and Jayaratne, 2017), and result in either ignoring factually correct information that conflicts with one's view or doubling down on misperceptions in spite of exposure to correct information (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). If information about the historical and structural roots of racial inequality has divergent effects on racial policy beliefs and attitudes, then such information may fail to persuade and cause convergent beliefs, and instead may amplify intergroup conflict between partisans and racial groups.

Experimental studies of the effects of historical information on beliefs in racial inequality are scarce.[2] To our knowledge, only two previous experimental studies exist on this causal effect. In a small survey experiment (n=369), Bonam et al. (2019, Study 2) present experimental evidence that historical information about past government-sanctioned racial housing discrimination delivered in an audio clip can lead whites to report being more certain that the portrayal of Black people in the American media was racist. In two survey experiments (n's=701 for Study 1; 903 for Study 2), Onyeador et al. (2020) test whether

[1] A notable exception in the broader domain of intergroup conflict is Nyhan and Zeitzoff (2018).

[2] Our study also complements a related observational research program in psychology on the "Marley hypothesis" (Nelson, Adams and Saltery, 2013; Bonam et al., 2019; Strickhouser, Zell and Harris, 2019).

providing white Americans with information about the persistence of racial disparities affects evaluations of progress toward racial economic equality since the 1960s, and find that their treatment causes participants to view the past more equitably. Building on this nascent line of research, we contribute new experimental evidence from two studies involving large, national census-balanced samples about the effect of historical information on beliefs about Black-white racial inequality. Moreover, in a key departure from existing research, we directly examine how an individual's partisanship and race condition how historical information affects belief formation, given the close association between race and party in contemporary American politics (Mason 2018).

Specifically, we designed and analyze data from an experiment fielded on two national, census-balanced samples of American adults (n = 702 for Study 1; 2,570 for Study 2) where subjects are randomly assigned to read information about the historical and structural roots of racial inequalities that grew out of landmark public policies in one of two policy domains (housing or jobs), their immediate effects on racial inequalities in the past, and the processes by which those effects endured to affect racial inequalities in the present. We assess how this information affects two main sets of beliefs that are arguably central for shaping durable policy attitudes: (1) belief in the existence of racial inequality (i.e., belief in the existence of the problem) and (2) beliefs in structural versus individualistic (or cultural) causes of racial inequality today (i.e., belief that the problem is systemic).

Across two studies, we find evidence that arguments emphasizing the historical and structural roots of contemporary racial inequalities can increase beliefs in the existence of Black-white racial inequality and increase beliefs in structural causes of racial inequality, specifically that racial inequality is mainly due to discrimination against Black Americans. These results are particularly strong among white Republicans and Independents. In addition to providing compelling evidence that exposure to historical information can induce believing that structural racial inequality exists, we also find evidence that exposure to historical information can reduce racial resentment among these groups. Taken together, our results

provide evidence that exposure to historical information can induce systemic and historical policy thinking about contemporary inequalities.

Along with having implications for scholarship on the determinants of racial attitudes, our findings also speak to larger questions about the relationship between ideas and power. The content of history education in schools has been a particularly contentious issue throughout American history, with accurate information about structural racism often being purposefully excluded from such settings (Mills, 2007, 30). Du Bois (1935), for example, described how a student in the early twentieth century could finish their education without learning the truth about abolition, the Civil War, and Reconstruction (713). More recently, the debate over "critical race theory"—often used by politicians on the right as a short-hand for all discussions of structural racism— has once again highlighted the level of resistance by many white Americans to engaging with the realities of racism. By demonstrating that learning about the historical roots of racial inequality can shift beliefs and attitudes, this paper highlights some of the potential consequences of efforts to suppress such information.

1 Responses to Historical Arguments about the Causes of Racial Inequality

1.1 Historical Accounts

Normative arguments about addressing racial inequality often invoke specific historical wrongs as a justification for present-day policy interventions. Katznelson (2005), for example, argues that affirmative action for African Americans can be justified by pointing to particular examples of past discrimination. He criticizes the limits of "generalized history"— references to past discrimination in a vague sense—as a justification for contemporary policy decisions, preferring instead Supreme Court Justice Lewis S. Powell's opinion in *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978), which included "quite demanding stipulations" for race-conscious policy prescriptions (Katznelson, 2005, 150, 154). Affirmative action, by this standard, is

justified when the past discrimination is "specific, identifiable, and broadly institutional."

Katznelson argues that the racial exclusions in the New Deal era, caused by the demands of southern legislators, are "consistent with this requirement" (160). He points to specific examples like the Social Security Act (1935) and the G.I. Bill (1944). The former excluded farmworkers and maids, "race-laden" provisions which meant that a majority of African Americans were not eligible for benefits (44). The latter, too, was written "under southern auspices" and administered with local discretion, meaning that the "gap in educational attainment between Blacks and whites widened rather than closed" (114, 134).

Coates (2014) similarly uses concrete historical examples to argue for the moral necessity of reparations for African Americans. "From the 1930s through the 1960s, Black people across the country were largely cut out of the legitimate home-mortgage market through means both legal and extralegal," he writes. Coates links this history directly to contemporary work on racial wealth inequality and the geospatial concentration of Black poverty. Rejecting the argument that "these depressing numbers partially stem from cultural pathologies that can be altered through individual grit and exceptionally good behavior," Coates instead emphasizes how past discrimination created the structural conditions for the perpetuation of racial inequality.

While Coates is less focused on whether such arguments are persuasive to white Americans, Katznelson suggests that they might be. While executive and bureaucratic discretion provides certain opportunities to achieve such goals, Katznelson (2005) argues that extensions of affirmative action of the sort that he advocates "must move through the democratic process on the basis of a broad and popular constituency" (169). "Within the public at large," he argues, his approach "offers the best chance to make it possible to win backing for what inevitably is a difficult set of policies to persuade non-beneficiaries to approve" (Katznelson, 2005, 160).

1.2 Normative Theoretical Perspectives

Some work in normative political theory, however, is more cynical about the possibility of white racial attitudes changing in light of such new information. Hayward (2017), for example, is skeptical that providing factual knowledge will, in itself, solve the problem of what Mills calls "white ignorance" (404; Mills (2007)). Such ignorance, she argues, is "[n]ot reducible to an objective difficulty in seeing or knowing," but rather "a social and a structural phenomenon: a failure to see and to know that can be motivated, even when not fully conscious, and that is often resilient in the face of evidence and reason" (Hayward, 2017, 404). The tendency of many high school textbooks to not accurately reflect contemporary historiography, for example, might be solved simply via exposure to higher quality historical information. But Hayward suggests that even if more white Americans were to "read a more accurate history text, for example, one that detailed the ways racial oppression was produced and is maintained in my society," their "own internalized beliefs and assumptions" might help to maintain their ignorance even in the face of this new information (Hayward, 2017, 404-405).

1.3 Psychological Theoretical Frameworks

There are compelling theoretical reasons to think that each account has merit. Research showing that individuals update their attitudes in accordance with counter-attitudinal information suggests that Katznelson's claim is empirically plausible (e.g., Guess and Coppock, 2020). Even if most Americans are not perfect Bayesians, Bullock (2009) argues that individuals' responses to new information is often more consistent with Bayesian rationality than more cynical perspectives have acknowledged (see also Gerber and Green, 1999).

However, there are also reasons to think that Hayward (2017) and Mills (2007) might be correct. This expectation is grounded in research on partisan motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Lodge and Taber, 2013). When affective polarization is high and parties are racially polarized, whites who encounter and construe information about past

racial injustices as counter-attitudinal will aim to preserve and enhance their esteem vis-à-vis their self-image or group-image. Thus, among racially conservative whites, exposure to such information might actually reinforce their pre-existing policy beliefs and attitudes rather than cause updating in accordance with the information. Motivated reasoning is perhaps especially likely among white Americans when the issue is related to the extent of racial discrimination that exists in society (Cole, 2018; Feldman and Huddy, 2018).[3]

2 Beliefs in the Existence and Causes of Racial Inequality

There is a large scholarly literature examining the origins of beliefs about inequality and what processes are (and are not) likely to change them. Some accounts suggest that such beliefs might form early and persist (Kinder and Dale-Riddle, 2012; Kinder, 2013), while other accounts posit that they might morph over time instead (Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Different sub-attitudes might have different characteristics, making them more or less susceptible to change in response to information. We understand beliefs about inequality to be rooted in early socialization processes—and thus difficult to change—but also responsive to changes in salience induced by the political environment, including the positions of the political parties.

Based on this understanding of where inequality beliefs originate and how different types of attitudes might have different susceptibilities to change, we focus on the effects of historical information on the underlying beliefs that might shape policy attitudes—specifically the extent to which individuals see racial inequality as a problem or not, and the extent to which they view it as primarily resulting from structural factors or individualistic/cultural ones—rather than policy attitudes themselves. We do this because we suspect that one prerequisite for *durable* policy attitude change may involve changing beliefs about the nature of the policy problem itself. This expectation is motivated by psychological research arguing that people may bring their attitudes in line with their standing beliefs as a way to seek

[3]It is also possible that people with strong crystalized attitudes might be resistant to new information for reasons other than motivated reasoning. Although a direct test of these competing mechanisms is beyond the scope of this study, this could be an interesting area for future research. Our primary goal, however, is to assess whether our treatments move attitudes or not in the first place.

belief consistency, which suggests that changing standing beliefs could potentially change related attitudes (for an overview of this literature see, e.g., McGrath, 2017). When it comes to racial inequality, a major question is whether individuals perceive it as originating from structural causes or more individualistic and/or cultural ones. To the extent that individuals see racial inequality as being the result of structural factors, we suspect that they will be more likely to see the solution as requiring structural responses. However, to the extent that they see racial inequality as being the result of individual or cultural factors, we hypothesize they are more likely to be suspicious of policy solutions to redress racial inequities. In this paper, however, we focus on the first part: underlying assessments of the nature of inequality itself, with the relationship between these underlying assessments of inequality and policy attitudes being set aside for future work if we find the first part to be empirically substantiated.

Public opinion researchers have measured these kinds of racial attitudes in a couple of standard ways. Perhaps most familiar to political scientists is the "racial resentment" scale, which taps into feelings that Black Americans violate traditional values related to individualism and hard work (Kinder and Sears, 1981). The questions that make up the scale are in fact closer to measures of structural vs. individualistic attributions for the causes of racial inequality. Indeed, recent research by Kam and Burge (2018) argues that based on an investigation of how respondents actually understand these questions, "racial resentment" should be thought of instead as "Structural versus Individual Attributions for Black Americans' Economic and Social Status." Rather than assuming racial resentment is a stable attitude, we instead looking at racial resentment as an outcome variable to see whether it is in fact endogenous to learning about historical information regarding the origins of racial inequality.

3 Design

We first conducted a pilot experiment that randomly exposed subjects to information about the historical roots of present-day racial inequalities and assessed whether this information

affected beliefs about the causes of present-day racial inequality (Study 1). We then replicated the experiment with a larger sample (Study 2).

3.1 Subjects

Subjects for Study 1 were recruited on March 27, 2019, from Lucid, an online vendor that provides respondents from multiple online respondent pools that have been shown to validate the demographic, political, psychological, and experimental results of prior studies (Coppock and McClellan, 2019). Respondents recruited for the study comprised a census-balanced sample of U.S. adults. The experiment includes 702 subjects. Subjects for Study 2 were recruited on June 10 and June 15, 2019, from Lucid, with respondents again comprising a census-balanced sample of U.S. adults. The second sample includes 2,570 subjects.

3.2 Treatments and Randomization

Subjects were randomly assigned with equal probability to one of three conditions: (1) a pure control condition, in which no information was shown, (2) a treatment script about racial inequality in housing (which we label the "housing" treatment), or (3) a treatment script about racial inequality in jobs and income (which we label the "jobs" treatment).[4]

Table 1 displays the full text of the treatment scripts. Both treatments were constructed to convey similar information using the same succinct, three paragraph structure while being of similar length. The treatments were crafted to capture realistic arguments of the sort that might appear in an op-ed piece.[5] To introduce the topic, subjects are told in the first paragraph of the treatment script that in their assigned policy area ("housing" or "jobs and income"), "important public policies discriminated against African Americans"

[4]We verify that the randomization procedure is valid using randomization inference. The probability of obtaining a log-likelihood statistic (from a multinomial logistic regression of treatment assignment on pre-treatment covariates) at least as large as the observed test statistic is p=0.691 in Study 1 and p=0.709 in Study 2. The pre-treatment covariates are: gender, race/ethnicity, party identification (3-point), education, urban/rural, household income, region, age, age-squared, political interest, religion, born again, and ideology (7-point).

[5]Similar styles of treatments have been shown to have effects on a range of other kinds of attitudes (Coppock, Ekins and Kirby, 2018).

seeking economic opportunities ("seeking to buy or rent homes" for the housing treatment; "seeking educational and employment opportunities" for the jobs treatment). The second paragraph of the treatment script then provides a historical example of a policy in that issue area (the National Housing Act for the housing treatment and the G.I. Bill for the jobs treatment), states the policy's general aim, but points out that it also generated immediate racial inequalities between Black and white Americans by discriminating against potential Black recipients and by allowing whites to be the main beneficiaries of the policy. The third paragraph further explains the processes through which each policy created immediate racial disparities, as well as the how those immediate policy impacts have led to enduring, long-term racial inequalities between Black and white Americans that persist to this day.

Table 1. Treatment Scripts

Housing Treatment	Jobs Treatment
In housing, important public policies discriminated against African Americans seeking to buy or rent homes. For example, the National Housing Act (1934) was passed during the Great Depression to help make housing and home mortgages more affordable. However, this policy also allowed for the "redlining" of many black neighborhoods, which severely restricted housing opportunities for African Americans but not whites. This is because black homebuyers were marked as bad credit risks and lenders were discouraged from lending in predominantly African American neighborhoods. At the same time, many black homebuyers were excluded from more favorable neighborhoods inhabited by whites. Studies have found that the long term effect of such discriminatory policies is that black households remain disproportionately located in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates, lower home values, declining infrastructure, and fewer employment opportunities compared to predominantly white neighborhoods.	In jobs and income, important public policies discriminated against African Americans seeking educational and employment opportunities. For example, the G. I. Bill (1944) encouraged long-term economic growth by offering job training and educational support to large numbers of returning World War II veterans. However, this policy offered substantially more benefits to white veterans than it did to black veterans. This is because black veterans did not have access to the same segregated schools and training opportunities as whites. Black veterans from the southern states – where three-quarters of African Americans lived – made no gains in educational attainment. Studies have found that the ultimate outcome of the policy was to increase inequality in economic and educational attainment between black and white Americans. This gap in educational and employment opportunities for African Americans compared to whites has largely endured despite recent efforts to close it.

Several additional features of the treatment scripts are notable. First, we designed the treatments to provide specific policy information (i.e., specific policies, short-term

impacts, and information about processes that cause both historical and present-day racial inequality)—rather than abstract arguments—to test the effectiveness of higher-quality historical information directly addressing specific beliefs. Second, we designed two different treatments that vary by issue, rather than a single treatment providing information about a single policy-specific historical cause of present-day racial inequality, in order to explore whether effects might differ by the policy (and associated argument) presented and by the relative salience of the policy and argument in contemporary political discourse. The housing treatment makes salient the long history of redlining and racial housing discrimination in the United States, topics which have garnered considerable media attention in the United States in recent years (e.g., Coates, 2014), whereas the jobs treatment script concerns Black-white inequalities and intergenerational racial stratification created by the G.I. Bill, topics and arguments which are virtually absent from recent U.S. political discourse, but are important components of Katznelson's (2005) argument.

3.3 Outcomes

We examine two main sets of outcome measures: (1) subjects' belief in the existence of Black-white inequality and (2) subjects' beliefs in various structural versus individual or cultural causes of present-day racial inequality.

To measure subjects' belief in the existence of Black-white inequality, we ask: "Do you believe that racial differences in jobs, income, and housing between African Americans and whites exist?" Response options are coded 1 = Yes and 0 = otherwise (No or Don't Know) which allows us to substantively interpret this outcome as the percent who say they believe in the existence of inequality.

We operationalize subjects' beliefs in various structural versus individual/cultural causes of present-day racial inequality in two ways. First, we employ the racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sanders, 1996), which we interpret as a measure of structural versus individual attributions for Black Americans' economic and social status following Kam and Burge

(2018).[6]

Second, we directly measure subjects' belief in structural versus individual/cultural causes of Black-white inequality using an augmented battery of items from the General Social Survey (GSS) (Kluegel, 1990). These items ask respondents whether they think Black-white disparities are due to (1) discrimination against Black people, (2) less in-born ability to learn among African Americans, (3) African Americans' lack of educational opportunities to rise out of poverty, (4) African Americans' lack of motivation, and (5) greater family instability in the African American community; responses are coded 1=Yes, 0=otherwise (No/Don't Know).[7] The first and third items measure beliefs in structural causes of racial inequality, while the other three measure beliefs in individual/cultural causes (Kluegel, 1990; Lopez Bunyasi and Smith, 2019). Following prior research and to address multiple comparison concerns, our primary outcome measures combine the structural cause items into an index measure and the individual/cultural cause items into an index measure. As a secondary analysis, we also examine effects on each item separately to understand whether observed effects on the index measures are driven by effects on certain specific beliefs.[8]

By employing two different operationalizations of beliefs in structural versus individual causes of racial inequality, we can assess how robust our findings are to alternative measurement strategies. Consistent evidence of effects across similarly-defined measures would provide greater confidence in the validity of results. We randomize the order of the racial resentment battery and the modified GSS battery to pre-empt potential question priming effects.[9]

[6]Full details about the survey items for racial resentment scale are in the online appendix.

[7]See online appendix for full wording and details about these items. The first four items correspond to the GSS variables `racdif1`, `racdif2`, `racdif3`, and `racdif4`; the fifth was developed by Lopez Bunyasi and Smith (2019).

[8]Our main outcomes are specified as index measures to extend prior research using similar measures, but we find these items exhibit relatively poor internal consistency in our sample (see online appendix for details). Thus the analysis of effects on each belief is arguably more interpretable. Moreover, because the index measures are average scores that place equal weight on component measures, we also conduct a robustness check by estimating treatment effects after fitting logistic regression models for binomial counts. We find consistent results, with the minor exception that the effect of the housing treatment on belief in individual/cultural causes among Independents is barely significant or just shy of significant depending on the analysis. Details are in the online appendix (see Table S17); we report both for transparency.

[9]We find no order effects in Study 1. However, we do find order effects in Study 2, which affirms our choice to randomize the order. See Tables S3, S4 and S5 in the online appendix for estimates from the order

4 Results

Does exposure to information about the historical and structural roots of racial inequality affect the incidence of belief in the existence of racial inequality, the incidence of belief in structural causes of racial inequality, and racial resentment? To answer these questions, we use OLS to regress each outcome of interest on a binary indicator for assignment to the housing treatment and a binary indicator for assignment to the jobs treatment (omitting assignment to the control group as the comparison group).[10] For each quantity of interest, we conduct two-sided tests of the null hypothesis that the effect is zero.

Our main analyses are conducted on the pooled sample among white Americans and by partisan subgroup among white Americans (i.e., Democrats, Independents, and Republicans) where leaners are included with partisans. We focus on white Americans because many of the theories motivating this study focus specifically on white Americans (and more specifically, white conservatives).[11] We partition by party in this analysis for two substantive reasons. First, because the Democratic and Republican parties are racially polarized and sorted where Democrats are more likely to be and support racial minorities and Republicans are more likely to be homogeneously white (Mason, 2018; Reny, Collingwood and Valenzuela, 2019), we expect partisanship to be a primary dimension along which baseline beliefs about racial inequality are likely to vary (Engelhardt, 2021a). That is, we expect the baseline incidence of belief in racial inequality and belief in structural causes of racial inequality to be high among Democrats and low among Republicans. Second and relatedly, given expectations of qualitative differences in baseline levels of these beliefs by party, we may also expect treatment effects to vary by party, as well as a potential ceiling effect for Democrats who are

effects analysis. Since the order effects finding is not consistent across studies, we are unable to offer a clear interpretation here, although this merits future study.

[10]The OLS estimator of treatment effects is unbiased (see, e.g., Gerber and Green (2012); Gomila (2021)), but we also show in the online appendix how treatment effect estimates are not materially affected when using an alternative estimator, such as logistic regression for binary outcomes.

[11]We conduct parallel analyses for the full sample, which leads to generally similar findings. Due to space constraints, these results are presented and discussed in the online appendix.

expected to have a high baseline level of belief in structural racial inequality. In addition, we formally test between-party differences in control group levels and in treatment effects using OLS regression including treatment-by-party interactions.[12]

For brevity, we pool the studies together and include study fixed effects.[13] We present results with and without pre-treatment covariates; the findings are generally consistent. Our primary specification, which we discuss in the text, are models that control for pre-treatment covariates and that include study fixed effects.

4.1 Effects on Belief in the Existence of Black-White Racial Inequality among White Americans

We begin by assessing the baseline incidence of belief in the existence of Black-white inequality by examining estimated group means by party in the control condition.[14] The level of belief in the existence of Black-white inequality is highest among white Democrats (where 79.9% say they believe in its existence), followed by white Independents (50.9%), and lowest among white Republicans (41.5%). Differences in the share who say they believe in the existence of Black-white inequality are statistically and substantively significant when comparing white Independents to white Democrats (Ind-Dem: -29.0pp, $p<0.05$), and when comparing white Republicans to white Democrats (Rep-Dem: -38.3pp, $p<0.05$). The difference between white Independents and white Republicans is also significant (Rep-Ind: -0.09pp, $p<0.05$). These descriptive results comport with theoretical expectations about differences in baseline levels of belief in structural racial inequality between partisan subgroups and provide face validity.

Next, we evaluate whether the housing and job treatments altered beliefs in the existence of

[12]These results are discussed in the text; full regression tables for models including treatment-by-party interactions may be found in Tables S14 and S15 in the online appendix. For the main results focusing on white Americans, additional post-estimation calculations of adjusted predicted mean outcomes by experimental condition and party are shown in Table S18 in the online appendix.

[13]In Tables S10 to S13 in the online appendix, we show in a series of sensitivity analyses that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of study fixed effects.

[14]We report predicted group means and between-party differences in mean in the control group. Predictions adjust for pre-treatment covariates and study fixed effects that we control for in our primary model specification. See Table S18 in the online appendix for full details.

Table 2. Treatment Effects on Belief in the Existence of Black-White Inequality among White Americans

	Outcome: Belief in Existence of Black-White Inequality							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.070***	0.079***	0.009	0.016	0.209***	0.233***	0.113***	0.110***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Jobs	0.010	0.026	0.040	0.049	−0.045	−0.035	0.054	0.051
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Constant	0.540***	0.659***	0.751***	0.788***	0.449***	0.578**	0.351***	0.567***
	(0.025)	(0.094)	(0.032)	(0.141)	(0.063)	(0.249)	(0.041)	(0.160)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	913	913	374	374	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Outcome variable is coded 1=Yes, 0=Otherwise (No or Don't Know).
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Black-white inequality. As Table 2 shows, among all white Americans, the housing treatment increases the proportion who say Black-white inequality exists by about 0.08 (s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$). This positive effect is driven by white Independents, for whom the average effect of the housing treatment is 0.23 (s.e.=0.06, $p<0.01$), and to a lesser extent by Republicans, for whom the treatment effect is 0.11 (s.e.=0.04, $p<0.05$).[15] While the difference in housing treatment effects between white Republicans and white Independents is just shy of statistical significance (-0.13, s.e.=0.07, $p=0.06$), these are substantively large effects that increase the percent who say Black-White inequality exists from their respective baseline levels to about 74% among white Independents and about 53% among white Republicans. Among white Democrats, the effect of the housing treatment is statistically indistinguishable from

[15]These average marginal effect estimates are virtually identical when estimated using a logistic regression instead of OLS regression; see Table S1 in the online appendix for details. Results are directionally consistent when using an alternate coding of the outcome variable (1=Yes, 0.5=Don't know, 0=No); see Table S2 in the online appendix for these results.

zero, which may be due to ceiling effects given the higher baseline level of belief among white Democrats. By contrast, we do not find any statistically significant effects of the jobs treatment.

4.2 Effects on Racial Resentment among White Americans

Having established that historical information can affect beliefs about the existence of Black-white inequality, we now examine whether information about the historical and structural roots of racial inequality affects levels of belief in structural or individualist causes for racial inequality. We begin with our first operationalization of this outcome, the racial resentment scale interpreted as levels of belief in individualist (as opposed to structural) attributions for Black Americans' economic and social status. Given the coding of the racial resentment measure which ranges from -2 (lowest) to 2 (highest), negative treatment effect estimates (i.e., reducing racial resentment) can be interpreted as increasing belief in structural explanations for Black-white racial inequality.

In the control group, the baseline level of racial resentment is highest among Republicans (0.82), followed by Independents (0.35), and then Democrats (-0.51). The differences in baseline levels of racial resentment between Independents and Democrats (0.86, $p<0.05$), between Republicans and Democrats (1.33, $p<0.05$), and between Republicans and Independents (0.47, $p<0.05$) are all statistically significant and provide face validity.[16]

Focusing next on treatment effects, Table 3 shows that among all white Americans, the housing treatment reduces racial resentment by -0.09 points (s.e.=0.05, $p<0.1$). This effect is driven by white Independents, among whom the housing treatment reduces racial resentment by 0.41 points (s.e.=0.12, $p<0.01$). We observe no statistically significant effect of the housing treatment on racial resentment among white Democrats or white Republicans.

The estimated effect for the jobs treatment is -0.04 among all white Americans, but this is not statistically significant. Among white Republicans, however, the jobs treatment reduces racial resentment by 0.16 points (s.e.=0.07, $p<0.05$). The jobs treatment has no statistically

[16]See Table S18 in the online appendix for details.

Table 3. Treatment Effects on Racial Resentment among White Americans

	Outcome: Racial Resentment Score (-2 lowest to 2 highest)							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	−0.058	−0.085*	−0.061	−0.020	−0.399***	−0.410***	−0.113	−0.091
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.070)	(0.068)
Jobs	0.019	−0.037	0.043	0.012	−0.020	−0.037	−0.174**	−0.158**
	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.083)	(0.074)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.070)	(0.068)
Constant	0.166***	−0.101	−0.441***	−0.737**	0.358***	0.404	0.787***	0.217
	(0.058)	(0.196)	(0.085)	(0.344)	(0.125)	(0.506)	(0.075)	(0.284)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	913	913	374	374	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Outcome variable ranges from -2 (low) to 2 (high).
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

significant effect on racial resentment among white Democrats or white Independents.

4.3 Effects on Beliefs in Structural versus Individual or Cultural Causes of Racial Inequality among White Americans

Next, we examine the same question using an alternative set of outcome measures: direct measures of subjects' belief in specific structural, individualist, or cultural causes of Black-white inequality from the modified GSS battery. We begin by discussing results for the structural and individual/cultural causal belief indices, then discuss results for individual items.

Focusing first on baseline levels, in the control group white Democrats (0.65) are more likely than white Independents (0.35), who are more likely than Republicans (0.18), to believe that racial inequality is caused by structural causes. These between-group differences (Ind-Dem: -0.29, Rep-Dem: -0.46, Rep-Ind: -0.17) are consistent with our expectations and are all statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). By contrast, at baseline white Democrats and white

Independents have similar and statistically indistinguishable mean outcomes on the individualist/cultural causal belief index (0.23 for white Democrats, 0.26 for white Independents). White Republicans, by comparison, are more likely to believe in individualist/cultural causes of racial inequality: their control group mean of 0.37 is significantly higher than the control means for both white Democrats and white Independents (Rep-Dem: 0.14, Rep-Ind: 0.11; $p<0.05$ for both).

Table 4 shows that among all white Americans, the housing treatment increases the belief in structural causes index (0.06, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$). This effect is particularly strong among white Independents (0.16, s.e.=0.06, $p<0.05$) and white Republicans (0.08, s.e.=0.03, $p<0.01$), although the difference in effects between white Republicans and white Independents is not significant (-0.09, s.e.=0.06, $p=0.11$). The jobs treatment also increases the belief in structural causes index among white Americans (0.05, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.05$), in particular among white Republicans (0.08, s.e.=0.03, $p<0.01$). By contrast, as Table 5 shows, neither the housing nor the jobs treatment has a significant effect on the individual/cultural causal belief index among white Americans overall or by party.

Next we turn to the effects of each treatment on belief in specific causes of Black-white racial inequality (by row) for white Americans overall and by party (by column). To address the potential multiple comparison problem when making inferences about effects on each of the adapted GSS items, we calculate Benjamini-Hochberg adjusted p-values to control the false discovery rate. The first two rows of Figure 1 show treatments effects on belief in different structural causes of racial inequality and the last three rows show this for individual/cultural causes.

These results indicate that for white Americans overall, white Independents, and white Republicans, the observed effects of the housing treatment on the structural causes index outcome are driven by effects on the belief that inequality is rooted in discrimination against Black Americans. The housing treatment increases this belief by 9.5 percentage points (s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$) among all white Americans, 18.7 pp among white Independents (s.e.=0.06,

Table 4. Treatment Effects on Belief in Structural Causes of Inequality Index among White Americans

	Outcome: Belief in Structural Causes of Inequality Index							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.046**	0.057***	0.026	0.022	0.153***	0.156***	0.080***	0.083***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Jobs	0.024	0.045**	0.031	0.039	0.024	0.032	0.078***	0.078***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Constant	0.420***	0.387***	0.607***	0.579***	0.371***	0.231	0.225***	0.426***
	(0.023)	(0.080)	(0.032)	(0.138)	(0.054)	(0.213)	(0.032)	(0.120)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	913	913	374	374	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

$p<0.01$), and 12.5 pp among Republicans (s.e.=0.03, $p<0.01$).[17]

Similarly, for white Republicans, the observed effect of the jobs treatment on the structural causes index outcome is driven by increasing beliefs that inequality is rooted in discrimination against Black Americans (7.5pp, s.e. =0.03, $p<0.05$) and by increasing beliefs that inequality is due to most Black Americans not having the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty (8.1pp, s.e.=0.04, $p<0.05$), two beliefs directly addressed by the argument in the jobs treatment.

Consistent with the finding that neither the housing treatment nor the jobs treatment affects the belief in individualist/cultural causes of inequality index measure, we find no evidence that these treatments have significant effects on any component of that index measure among white Americans or white partisan subgroups.

[17]The difference in effects between white Republicans and white Independents is not statistically significant.

Table 5. Treatment Effects on Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes of Inequality Index among White Americans

	Outcome: Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes of Inequality Index							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	−0.006	−0.009	−0.009	−0.001	−0.074**	−0.063	−0.006	−0.003
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Jobs	0.024	0.020	0.013	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.018	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Constant	0.293***	0.216***	0.268***	0.099	0.237***	−0.056	0.355***	0.451***
	(0.016)	(0.062)	(0.024)	(0.104)	(0.038)	(0.157)	(0.026)	(0.099)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	913	913	374	374	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

5 Discussion

In this paper, we contribute new descriptive and experimental evidence to longstanding normative and positive debates about whether providing Americans, particularly white Americans, with information about historical racial injustices affects how they think about contemporary inequality. To do so, we designed and analyze data from a survey experiment fielded on two large, census-balanced national samples of American adults where subjects are randomly assigned to read and evaluate a realistic argument emphasizing the historical, structural cause of racial inequality. One treatment emphasized housing policy, while the other emphasized jobs and income.

The housing treatment increased belief in racial inequality's existence and belief in discrimination against African Americans as a structural cause of racial inequality among both white Independents and Republicans, but decreased racial resentment only among white

Figure 1. Treatment Effects on Beliefs in Specific Causes of Inequality, White Americans only



Figure shows covariate adjusted OLS estimates with 95% CIs.
Darker markers and lines denote statistically significant effects (B-H adjusted p-value < 0.05); else shown in gray.

Independents (and not white Republicans). By contrast, among white Republicans, the jobs treatment decreased racial resentment and increased belief in discrimination and a lack of educational opportunities among African Americans as causes of racial inequality, but did

not increase belief in the existence of racial inequality itself.[18]

Taken together, these results provide evidence that information about the historical roots of contemporary racial inequality can in fact shape racial beliefs. In particular, we found that white respondents in the treatment conditions, rather than engaging in motivated reasoning and exhibiting divergent beliefs, seem to update their beliefs in the direction of the information they receive about the existence of racial inequality and the extent to which it is caused by structural factors when presented with specific information about past discriminatory policies.

We conclude by reflecting on several questions that arise from our findings that merit future research. One is that we do not observe consistent effects, especially among white Republicans, of historical information on both beliefs about racial inequality's existence and beliefs in various structural causes of racial inequality. We suspect this reflects differences between acknowledging a problem, acknowledging the causes of a problem, and agreeing on the solution. This suggests that even if more Americans acknowledge that racial inequality exists, agreeing on solutions to meaningfully redress it may be more difficult.

Our results also suggest the possibility of variation across types of historical arguments, with the housing treatment being more consistently effective across a range of outcomes. Future research will be required to determine whether this is a difference that will generally persist (i.e., whether arguments about housing are fundamentally more persuasive), or whether it is a result of the G.I. Bill specifically being less persuasive to respondents than redlining. We tentatively speculate that housing inequality might seem more broadly applicable to respondents, while the G. I. Bill might seem too historically specific, even if there is empirical evidence that it had broad social consequences.

We also observe heterogeneity by partisanship. Although we find evidence that both Independents and Republicans are responsive to historical arguments, the evidence is somewhat stronger for Independents. We speculate that this is because Republicans have likely received

[18] As we discuss below, these apparent inconsistencies—in when we observe effects on beliefs in inequality's existence and various causes—should be investigated in future research.

stronger elite cues that cut against the arguments we present. Independents, by contrast, are probably the least likely group to exhibit ideological constraint on such issues, although further research would be required to substantiate this.

Future work might also examine whether there are also heterogeneous effects across other demographic categories, such as age and gender. Assessing such differences might have implications for the real-world design and implementation of similar treatments. Due to space constraints (and because we pre-specified analyses focusing on effects by party), we are unable to offer that analysis here. But given growing political divides across demographic lines, this would be a fruitful area for further study. That said, we think there is reason to believe that partisan differences are likely to be more central, particularly as traditional demographic differences have increasingly mapped onto partisan identification.

Future scholarship might also further examine whether (and why) retrospective harms might be viewed more sympathetically than ongoing ones. Rucker and Richeson (2021), for example, argue that views of racism as being about individual prejudice rather than structural disadvantage help maintain support for ongoing racial stratification in the contemporary criminal justice system. This raises important questions about the role of history in our findings. Although many Americans might respond sympathetically to learning about long-ago discrimination in housing, it is not so clear that they would respond in the same way to a newer policy producing similar effects. Future work might compare results from treatments that hold the policy area constant but vary the historical/contemporary dimension.

Our findings also raise questions about where people might be exposed to such information in the real world. One possible venue is schools. Scholarship on the political consequence of education suggests both the potential and challenges of this prospect. Campbell and Niemi (2016) find that civics education has a positive effect on knowledge, although Nelsen (2021*b*) finds that civic education courses have differential effects on participatory attitudes across racial and ethnic groups. Importantly, the content of civics courses matters. Nelsen (2021*a*) presents experimental evidence that civics education involving critical pedagogy designed to

interrogate systems of power (Freire, 1970; hooks, 1994) is more effective at increasing the willingness of Black and Latino youth to participate in politics. If schools are to be venues for learning about the history of structural racism, it would likely require critical pedagogical approaches. However, schools are sites of contestation over precisely these matters, and there is likely to be resistance to providing this kind of historical information in many places.

Americans might also be exposed to information about the historical roots of racial inequality by political actors. Elizabeth Warren, for example, discussed redlining in her presidential campaign and introduced legislation to address ongoing inequities that resulted from it. Of course, the rhetoric of politicians is largely mediated through the media environment, and unlike the experimental conditions we examine, people are exposed to competing information in the mass media and can often refuse to consider information that does not interest them (or is contrary to their self-perceptions). Future research might examine these effects in a more complex information environment (Engelhardt, 2021b).

We conclude by acknowledging that our survey experiments are inherently examining only one aspect of larger questions about historical knowledge and racial inequality. The normative theoretical arguments of Mills (2007) and others are more nuanced and critical than our more straight-forward treatments. Although we are inspired by such scholarship, we are not claiming to test it directly. It is also important to keep in mind that not all historical interventions will lead to the expected outcomes (Onyeador et al., 2020) and researchers and practitioners should be attentive to the possibility of unanticipated effects.

With these important caveats in mind, we think that our findings are at least suggestive of the possibility that historical interventions might lead more Americans, particularly white Americans, to acknowledge racial inequality and view its origins in more structural, rather than individual, terms. Although this would hardly be a cure-all for lingering racial inequities in American society, it might offer one way to start working towards that goal.

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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY

Supplemental Information for:

Historical Information and Beliefs About Racial Inequality

June 27, 2022

A Survey Instrument and Treatment Script Details

A.1 Housing Treatment

treat_housing_inst
Please read the following short passage.

To ensure that you have enough time to read, you will be allowed to proceed to the next page after 20 seconds have passed.

---

treat_housing_text
In housing, important public policies discriminated against African Americans seeking to buy or rent homes.

For example, the National Housing Act (1934) was passed during the Great Depression to help make housing and home mortgages more affordable. However, this policy also allowed for the "redlining" of many black neighborhoods, which severely restricted housing opportunities for African Americans but not whites.

This is because black homebuyers were marked as bad credit risks and lenders were discouraged from lending in predominantly African American neighborhoods. At the same time, many black homebuyers were excluded from more favorable neighborhoods inhabited by whites. Studies have found that the long term effect of such discriminatory policies is that black households remain disproportionately located in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates, lower home values, declining infrastructure, and fewer employment opportunities compared to predominantly white neighborhoods.

---

treat_housing_timer Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

A.2 Jobs Treatment

treat_jobs_inst
Please read the following short passage.

To ensure that you have enough time to read, you will be allowed to proceed to the next page after 20 seconds have passed.

---

treat_jobs_text
In jobs and income, important public policies discriminated against African Americans seeking educational and employment opportunities.

For example, the G. I. Bill (1944) encouraged long-term economic growth by offering job training and educational support to large numbers of returning World War II veterans. However, this policy offered substantially more benefits to white veterans than it did to black veterans.

This is because black veterans did not have access to the same segregated schools and training opportunities as whites. Black veterans from the southern states -- where three-quarters of African Americans lived -- made no gains in educational attainment. Studies have found that the ultimate outcome of the policy was to increase inequality in economic and educational attainment between black and white Americans. This gap in educational and employment opportunities for African Americans compared to whites has largely endured despite recent efforts to close it.

---

treat_jobs_timer Timing
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Last Click (2)
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Click Count (4)

A.3 Outcome: Belief in Existence of Black-White Inequality

racdif_exist Do you believe that racial differences in jobs, income, and housing between African Americans and whites exist?

- ○ Yes (1)
- ○ No (2)
- ○ Don't Know (3)

A.4 Outcome: Racial Resentment

The following items were presented to subjects in a random order. For each item, subjects rate their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale (-2=strongly disagree to 2=strongly agree). The second and third items are reverse coded, then all items are combined into a mean index scale ranging from -2 to 2 ($\alpha = 0.75$ in the control group in Study 1 and $\alpha = 0.82$ in the control group in Study 2).

rr1

Do you agree or disagree with this statement:

Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

- ○ Strongly agree (1)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Strongly disagree (5)

rr2

Do you agree or disagree with this statement:

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

- ○ Strongly agree (1)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Strongly disagree (5)

rr3
Do you agree or disagree with this statement:

Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

- ○ Strongly agree (1)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Strongly disagree (5)

rr4
Do you agree or disagree with this statement:

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

- ○ Strongly agree (1)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Strongly disagree (5)

A.5 Outcome: Modified GSS Items

Our primary outcomes are index measures of belief in structural causes (items 1 and 3 below) and of belief in individual/cultural causes (items 2, 4, and 5 below). We additionally analyze effects on each item separately, both to understand whether effects on specific beliefs are driving observed effects on the index measures, and because items exhibit relatively poor internal consistency in our samples (in the Study 1 control group, α=0.49 for the structural explanation items and α=0.44 for the individualist/cultural explanation items; in the Study 2 control group, α=0.62 for the structural explanation items and α=0.51 for the individualist/cultural explanation items).
The following items (i.e., rows in the grid) were presented to subjects in a random order.

racdif On average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.

Do you think these differences are...

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)
Mainly due to discrimination (1)	○	○	○
Because most African Americans have less in-born ability to learn (2)	○	○	○
Because most African Americans don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty (3)	○	○	○
Because most African Americans just don't have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty (4)	○	○	○
Because there is more family instability in the African American community (5)	○	○	○

B Effects among the Full Sample

We find similar treatment effects when examining the full sample and do not condition on participants who identify as white Americans. (Note: Supporting tables and figures for this analysis are presented in Tables S6-S9, S15 and Figure S1 in the online appendix.)

Looking at the full sample, we again find evidence that the housing treatment increases belief in the existence of Black-white inequality (6.3 pp, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$), a finding that is concentrated among Independents (16.3 pp, s.e.=0.05, $p<0.01$) and Republicans (10.9 pp, s.e.=0.04, $p<0.01$), although the coefficients from the full sample analysis are slightly smaller for the overall and Independents findings than when looking at whites only. One difference in the full sample is that the jobs treatment increases belief in the existence of Black-white inequality (4.3 pp, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.05$), but the effect is concentrated primarily among Democrats (6.1 pp, s.e.=0.02, $p<.01$). These coefficient estimates in the full sample are directionally the same as those from the analysis among white Americans, but the latter were not statistically significant.

The results for racial resentment are weaker in the full sample than when looking only at whites. While we found a statistically significant effect for the housing treatment in reducing racial resentment among all white Americans, here the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant (-0.06, s.e.=0.04, n.s.). There is, however, a significant negative effect among Independents (-0.27, s.e.=0.10, $p<0.01$), although the size of the coefficient is smaller than when looking only at white Independents. Similar to the analysis of white Republicans, we find a significant negative effect of the jobs treatment that is concentrated among Republicans that is similar in magnitude (-0.16, s.e.=0.06, $p<0.05$).

We again see similar effects that are generally smaller in magnitude when looking at the full sample (as compared to the analysis of white Americans only) for the belief in structural and individual/cultural causes indices. The housing treatment increases beliefs in structural causes of inequality among all Americans (0.04, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$), particularly among

Independents (0.12, s.e.=0.04, $p<0.01$) and Republicans (0.07, s.e.=0.03, $p<0.01$). The jobs treatment also increases these beliefs among all Americans (0.05, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$), this is driven by Republicans (0.08, s.e.=0.03, $p<0.01$). One difference, though, is that in the full sample, there is suggestive evidence that the jobs treatment may marginally increase these beliefs among Democrats although this estimated effect is only significant at a 0.1 level (0.04, s.e.=0.02, $p<0.1$). In the analysis restricted to the white American subsample, this coefficient is positive but not statistically significant.

Finally, as Figure S1 shows, we find similar patterns when examining the effects of the housing and jobs treatments on specific beliefs in causes of inequality that comprise the belief in structural and individual/cultural causes indices. Similar to what we see in the analysis of the white subsample, in the full sample, the observed effects of the housing treatment on beliefs in structural causes of inequality are driven by increasing beliefs in inequality being caused by discrimination against Black people. In the full sample, as in the analysis of white Americans, we also observe the jobs treatment increasing Republicans' beliefs in inequality being caused by both discrimination against Black people and by Black people lacking of educational opportunities to rise out of poverty. We observe these effects in the pooled full sample as well.

C Additional Tables and Figures

Table S1. Comparing Marginal Effects from OLS vs Logistic Regressions – Treatment Effects on Belief in the Existence of Black-White Inequality among White Americans

				OLS Regression			Logistic Regression		
Sample	Treatment Effect	Study FE?	Covariates?	Estimate	(SE)	p-value	Estimate	(SE)	p-value
All	Housing	Yes	No	0.07	(0.02)	0.00	0.07	(0.02)	0.00
All	Jobs	Yes	No	0.01	(0.02)	0.67	0.01	(0.02)	0.67
All	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.08	(0.02)	0.00	0.08	(0.02)	0.00
All	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.03	(0.02)	0.25	0.03	(0.02)	0.24
Democrat	Housing	Yes	No	0.01	(0.03)	0.76	0.01	(0.03)	0.76
Democrat	Jobs	Yes	No	0.04	(0.03)	0.19	0.04	(0.03)	0.18
Democrat	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.03)	0.60	0.02	(0.04)	0.61
Democrat	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.05	(0.03)	0.11	0.07	(0.04)	0.10
Independent	Housing	Yes	No	0.21	(0.06)	0.00	0.21	(0.06)	0.00
Independent	Jobs	Yes	No	-0.05	(0.06)	0.45	-0.05	(0.06)	0.46
Independent	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.23	(0.06)	0.00	0.22	(0.06)	0.00
Independent	Jobs	Yes	Yes	-0.03	(0.06)	0.55	-0.04	(0.06)	0.55
Republican	Housing	Yes	No	0.11	(0.04)	0.00	0.11	(0.04)	0.00
Republican	Jobs	Yes	No	0.05	(0.04)	0.16	0.05	(0.04)	0.16
Republican	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.11	(0.04)	0.00	0.10	(0.04)	0.01
Republican	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.05	(0.04)	0.18	0.04	(0.04)	0.30

Cells contain average treatment effects estimated using OLS and logistic regression.
Outcome is coded as a binary variable, 1=Yes, 0=No/Don't know.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S2. Treatment Effects on Belief in the Existence of Black-White Inequality among White Americans (Alternate Outcome Coding: 1=Yes, 0.5=Don't Know, 0=No)

	Outcome: Belief in Existence of Black-White Inequality							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.060***	0.066***	0.005	0.009	0.175***	0.187***	0.103***	0.096***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Jobs	0.012	0.023	0.041	0.048*	−0.038	−0.031	0.048	0.043
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	0.626***	0.703***	0.802***	0.806***	0.595***	0.630***	0.450***	0.608***
	(0.022)	(0.082)	(0.027)	(0.119)	(0.050)	(0.204)	(0.037)	(0.143)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	913	913	374	374	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Outcome variable is coded 1=Yes, 0.5=Don't know, 0=No.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S3. No Order Effects between Racial Resentment Items and Modified GSS Items in Study 1

	RR Scale	Discrim	Educ Opp	Ability	No Motiv	Fam Inst	RR Scale	Discrim	Educ Opp	Ability	No Motiv	Fam Inst
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
RR First (vs Modified GSS First)	−0.061	−0.023	−0.079*	−0.027	0.003	0.009	−0.077	−0.011	−0.044	−0.040	0.021	0.041
	(0.097)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.081)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Constant	0.183***	0.464***	0.468***	0.131***	0.300***	0.476***	0.026	0.508***	0.484***	0.141***	0.269***	0.459***
	(0.066)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Sample	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498	702	702	702	702	702	702

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Table S4. Order Effects between Racial Resentment Items and Modified GSS Items in Study 2

	RR Scale	Discrim	Educ Opp	Ability	No Motiv	Fam Inst	RR Scale	Discrim	Educ Opp	Ability	No Motiv	Fam Inst
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
RR First (vs Modified GSS First)	0.002	−0.019	−0.049**	−0.013	0.033	0.017	0.00004	−0.049**	−0.036*	−0.017	0.026	0.016
	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Constant	0.086**	0.502***	0.480***	0.112***	0.282***	0.472***	−0.070**	0.564***	0.491***	0.131***	0.283***	0.476***
	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Sample	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,792	1,792	1,792	1,792	1,792	1,792	2,570	2,570	2,570	2,570	2,570	2,570

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Table S5. Order-by-Treatment Interaction Effects in Study 2

	RR Scale	Discrim	Educ Opp	Ability	No Motiv	Fam Inst	RR Scale	Discrim	Educ Opp	Ability	No Motiv	Fam Inst
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
RR First (vs Modified GSS First)	−0.071	0.039	0.003	−0.004	0.011	−0.037	−0.105	0.013	0.012	−0.018	0.004	−0.025
	(0.087)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.074)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Housing	−0.116	0.109***	0.068	0.035	−0.026	−0.052	−0.154**	0.113***	0.038	0.031	−0.047	−0.059*
	(0.091)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.075)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Jobs	0.0003	0.033	0.057	0.051**	0.010	−0.041	−0.060	0.065*	0.058*	0.032	−0.007	−0.041
	(0.091)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.076)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.035)
RR First x Housing	0.177	−0.115**	−0.121**	−0.005	0.031	0.048	0.215**	−0.113**	−0.102**	0.013	0.035	0.028
	(0.127)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.105)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.048)
RR First x Jobs	0.049	−0.068	−0.042	−0.024	0.037	0.119**	0.101	−0.070	−0.046	−0.007	0.031	0.092*
	(0.126)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.105)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Constant	0.123**	0.456***	0.440***	0.085***	0.287***	0.502***	0.002	0.505***	0.459***	0.110***	0.301***	0.510***
	(0.063)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Sample	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	Whites	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	1,792	1,792	1,792	1,792	1,792	1,792	2,570	2,570	2,570	2,570	2,570	2,570

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Table S6. Treatment Effects on Belief in the Existence of Black-White Inequality among Full Sample

	Outcome: Belief in Existence of Black-White Inequality							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.064***	0.063***	0.010	0.008	0.154***	0.163***	0.111***	0.109***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Jobs	0.038*	0.043**	0.056**	0.061***	−0.013	−0.010	0.058*	0.060*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Constant	0.577***	0.464***	0.763***	0.559***	0.464***	0.372*	0.366***	0.474***
	(0.021)	(0.084)	(0.025)	(0.115)	(0.052)	(0.225)	(0.038)	(0.159)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	3,272	3,272	1,556	1,556	546	546	1,170	1,170

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Outcome variable is coded 1=Yes, 0=Otherwise (No or Don't Know)
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, race/ethnicity, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S7. Treatment Effects on Belief in Racial Resentment among Full Sample

	Outcome: Racial Resentment Score (-2 lowest to 2 highest)							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	−0.071	−0.056	−0.054	−0.019	−0.256**	−0.267***	−0.123*	−0.102
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Jobs	−0.018	−0.034	0.003	−0.007	0.044	−0.011	−0.177***	−0.161**
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Constant	0.020	0.118	−0.474***	−0.324	0.103	0.215	0.727***	0.186
	(0.049)	(0.180)	(0.064)	(0.280)	(0.105)	(0.442)	(0.071)	(0.289)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	3,272	3,272	1,556	1,556	546	546	1,170	1,170

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.

Outcome variable ranges from -2 (low) to 2 (high).

Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, race/ethnicity, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S8. Treatment Effects on Belief in Structural Causes of Inequality Index among Full Sample

	Outcome: Belief in Structural Causes of Inequality Index							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.041**	0.042***	0.012	0.015	0.119***	0.124***	0.071**	0.070***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Jobs	0.041**	0.048***	0.037	0.042*	0.031	0.032	0.079***	0.078***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Constant	0.456***	0.390***	0.616***	0.527***	0.408***	0.522***	0.241***	0.376***
	(0.019)	(0.074)	(0.025)	(0.113)	(0.044)	(0.193)	(0.030)	(0.122)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	3,272	3,272	1,556	1,556	546	546	1,170	1,170

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.

Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, race/ethnicity, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S9. Treatment Effects on Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes of Inequality Index among Full Sample

	Outcome: Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes of Inequality Index							
	All	All	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	−0.014	−0.013	−0.015	−0.015	−0.050*	−0.040	−0.015	−0.013
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Jobs	0.014	0.013	0.008	−0.001	−0.002	−0.015	0.015	0.021
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	0.293***	0.324***	0.269***	0.273***	0.227***	0.186	0.368***	0.432***
	(0.014)	(0.057)	(0.019)	(0.090)	(0.030)	(0.134)	(0.024)	(0.099)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	3,272	3,272	1,556	1,556	546	546	1,170	1,170

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.

Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, race/ethnicity, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Figure S1. Treatment Effects on Beliefs in Specific Causes of Inequality, Full Sample



Figure shows covariate adjusted OLS estimates with 95% CIs.
Darker markers and lines denote statistically significant effects (B-H adjusted p-value < 0.05); else shown in gray.

Table S10. Sensitivity to Study Fixed Effects – Treatment Effects on Belief in the Existence of Black-White Inequality among White Americans

	Outcome: Belief in Existence of Black-White Inequality															
	All	All	All	All	Dem	Dem	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Housing	0.069***	0.070***	0.077***	0.079***	0.008	0.009	0.015	0.016	0.209***	0.209***	0.231***	0.233***	0.111***	0.113***	0.109***	0.110***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Jobs	0.008	0.010	0.024	0.026	0.041	0.040	0.049	0.049	−0.048	−0.045	−0.040	−0.035	0.048	0.054	0.045	0.051
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Constant	0.639***	0.540***	0.755***	0.659***	0.802***	0.751***	0.853***	0.788***	0.529***	0.449***	0.672***	0.578**	0.503***	0.351***	0.694***	0.567***
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.245)	(0.249)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.159)	(0.160)
With Study FEs?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	913	913	913	913	374	374	374	374	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Outcome variable is coded 1=Yes, 0=Otherwise.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S11. Sensitivity to Study Fixed Effects – Treatment Effects on Belief in Racial Resentment among White Americans

	Outcome: Racial Resentment Score (-2 lowest to 2 highest)															
	All	All	All	All	Dem	Dem	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Housing	−0.058	−0.058	−0.083*	−0.085*	−0.059	−0.061	−0.018	−0.020	−0.399***	−0.399***	−0.410***	−0.410***	−0.112	−0.113	−0.091	−0.091
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Jobs	0.021	0.019	−0.035	−0.037	0.043	0.043	0.012	0.012	−0.019	−0.020	−0.037	−0.037	−0.171**	−0.174**	−0.155**	−0.158**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Constant	0.113***	0.166***	−0.178	−0.101	−0.500***	−0.441***	−0.892***	−0.737**	0.317***	0.358***	0.412	0.404	0.717***	0.787***	0.155	0.217
	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.193)	(0.196)	(0.055)	(0.085)	(0.339)	(0.344)	(0.082)	(0.125)	(0.494)	(0.506)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.281)	(0.284)
With Study FEs?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	913	913	913	913	374	374	374	374	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Outcome variable ranges from -2 (low) to 2 (high).
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S12. Sensitivity to Study Fixed Effects – Treatment Effects on Belief in Structural Causes of Inequality Index among White Americans

	Outcome: Belief in Structural Causes of Inequality Index															
	All	All	All	All	Dem	Dem	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Housing	0.046**	0.046**	0.056***	0.057***	0.025	0.026	0.021	0.022	0.153***	0.153***	0.157***	0.156***	0.080***	0.080***	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Jobs	0.023	0.024	0.044**	0.045**	0.031	0.031	0.039	0.039	0.025	0.024	0.033	0.032	0.076**	0.078***	0.077***	0.078***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant	0.444***	0.420***	0.418***	0.387***	0.646***	0.607***	0.641***	0.579***	0.351***	0.371***	0.202	0.231	0.256***	0.225***	0.452***	0.426***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.208)	(0.213)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.119)	(0.120)
With Study FEs?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	913	913	913	913	374	374	374	374	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S13. Sensitivity to Study Fixed Effects – Treatment Effects on Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes of Inequality Index among White Americans

	Outcome: Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes of Inequality Index															
	All	All	All	All	Dem	Dem	Dem	Dem	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind	Rep	Rep	Rep	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Housing	−0.006	−0.006	−0.009	−0.009	−0.008	−0.009	−0.0004	−0.001	−0.074**	−0.074**	−0.064*	−0.063	−0.006	−0.006	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Jobs	0.024	0.024	0.020	0.020	0.013	0.013	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.017	0.018	0.021	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Constant	0.290***	0.293***	0.210***	0.216***	0.228***	0.268***	0.047	0.099	0.261***	0.237***	−0.026	−0.056	0.372***	0.355***	0.460***	0.451***
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.097)	(0.099)
With Study FEs?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	913	913	913	913	374	374	374	374	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,003

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the control group.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S14. Treatment-by-Party Interaction Effects on Main Outcome Variables among White Americans

	Dependent variable:							
	Ineq Exists	Ineq Exists	RR Scale	RR Scale	Struct Index	Struct Index	I/C Index	I/C Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.011	0.011	−0.061	−0.027	0.026	0.016	−0.008	−0.003
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Jobs	0.040	0.051	0.043	0.018	0.031	0.040	0.013	0.010
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Independent	−0.274***	−0.144***	0.817***	0.532***	−0.295***	−0.134***	0.033	0.057*
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Republican	−0.300***	−0.176***	1.218***	0.681***	−0.390***	−0.222***	0.144***	0.106***
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Housing x Independent	0.198***	0.220***	−0.337**	−0.416***	0.128**	0.153***	−0.066	−0.070
	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Jobs x Independent	−0.085	−0.089	−0.064	−0.043	−0.005	−0.010	−0.008	−0.012
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.141)	(0.132)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Housing x Republican	0.101**	0.094*	−0.052	−0.061	0.054	0.064	0.002	−0.002
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Jobs x Republican	0.012	−0.005	−0.216**	−0.165	0.047	0.036	0.004	0.015
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Constant	0.704***	0.796***	−0.439***	−0.612***	0.620***	0.542***	0.233***	0.141**
	(0.030)	(0.096)	(0.064)	(0.197)	(0.026)	(0.082)	(0.020)	(0.064)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290	2,290

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference categories are the control group and identifying as a Democrat.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S15. Treatment-by-Party Interaction Effects on Main Outcome Variables among the Full Sample

	Dependent variable:							
	Ineq Exists	Ineq Exists	RR Scale	RR Scale	Struct Index	Struct Index	I/C Index	I/C Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Housing	0.011	0.008	−0.053	−0.011	0.012	0.010	−0.015	−0.015
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Jobs	0.056**	0.063**	0.003	0.004	0.037	0.042*	0.008	0.002
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Independent	−0.258***	−0.133***	0.636***	0.393***	−0.262***	−0.133***	−0.015	0.013
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Republican	−0.281***	−0.166***	1.204***	0.696***	−0.365***	−0.216***	0.124***	0.099***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Housing x Independent	0.143***	0.155***	−0.201*	−0.276**	0.105**	0.122***	−0.035	−0.032
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Jobs x Independent	−0.069	−0.075	0.043	0.013	−0.007	−0.010	−0.010	−0.011
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Housing x Republican	0.099**	0.094**	−0.069	−0.078	0.059	0.056	−0.0002	0.004
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Jobs x Republican	−0.0004	−0.011	−0.180**	−0.154*	0.042	0.036	0.007	0.024
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Constant	0.716***	0.588***	−0.485***	−0.344*	0.622***	0.535***	0.256***	0.271***
	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.180)	(0.021)	(0.075)	(0.016)	(0.058)
With Study FEs?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	3,272	3,272	3,272	3,272	3,272	3,272	3,272	3,272

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cells contain OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference categories are the control group and identifying as a Democrat.

Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, race/ethnicity, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S16. Comparing Marginal Effects from OLS vs Logistic Regressions – Treatment Effects on Belief in Specific Causes of Inequality among White Americans (from Figure 1)

					OLS Regression			Logistic Regression		
Outcome (Belief in...)	Sample	Treatment Effect	Study FE?	Covariates?	Estimate	(SE)	p-value	Estimate	(SE)	p-value
Discrimination against Black People	All	Housing	Yes	No	0.09	(0.03)	0.00	0.09	(0.03)	0.00
Discrimination against Black People	All	Jobs	Yes	No	0.02	(0.03)	0.47	0.02	(0.03)	0.47
Discrimination against Black People	All	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.09	(0.02)	0.00	0.09	(0.02)	0.00
Discrimination against Black People	All	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.04	(0.02)	0.09	0.04	(0.02)	0.09
Discrimination against Black People	Democrat	Housing	Yes	No	0.07	(0.04)	0.06	0.07	(0.04)	0.05
Discrimination against Black People	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	No	0.01	(0.04)	0.71	0.01	(0.04)	0.71
Discrimination against Black People	Democrat	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.06	(0.04)	0.08	0.07	(0.04)	0.08
Discrimination against Black People	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.04)	0.67	0.01	(0.04)	0.75
Discrimination against Black People	Independent	Housing	Yes	No	0.19	(0.06)	0.00	0.19	(0.06)	0.00
Discrimination against Black People	Independent	Jobs	Yes	No	0.06	(0.06)	0.36	0.06	(0.06)	0.36
Discrimination against Black People	Independent	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.19	(0.06)	0.00	0.19	(0.06)	0.00
Discrimination against Black People	Independent	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.05	(0.06)	0.40	0.05	(0.06)	0.39
Discrimination against Black People	Republican	Housing	Yes	No	0.13	(0.04)	0.00	0.13	(0.04)	0.00
Discrimination against Black People	Republican	Jobs	Yes	No	0.08	(0.04)	0.03	0.08	(0.03)	0.03
Discrimination against Black People	Republican	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.12	(0.03)	0.00	0.12	(0.03)	0.00
Discrimination against Black People	Republican	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.08	(0.03)	0.03	0.07	(0.03)	0.03
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	All	Housing	Yes	No	0.01	(0.03)	0.79	0.01	(0.03)	0.79
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	All	Jobs	Yes	No	0.03	(0.03)	0.25	0.03	(0.03)	0.25
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	All	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.02)	0.43	0.02	(0.02)	0.42
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	All	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.05	(0.02)	0.03	0.05	(0.02)	0.03
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Democrat	Housing	Yes	No	-0.02	(0.04)	0.65	-0.02	(0.04)	0.65
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	No	0.05	(0.04)	0.22	0.05	(0.04)	0.22
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Democrat	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.02	(0.04)	0.62	-0.02	(0.04)	0.63
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.06	(0.04)	0.09	0.07	(0.04)	0.08
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Independent	Housing	Yes	No	0.12	(0.06)	0.06	0.12	(0.06)	0.06
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Independent	Jobs	Yes	No	-0.01	(0.06)	0.90	-0.01	(0.06)	0.90
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Independent	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.13	(0.06)	0.04	0.13	(0.06)	0.04
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Independent	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.01	(0.06)	0.83	0.01	(0.06)	0.84
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Republican	Housing	Yes	No	0.03	(0.04)	0.36	0.03	(0.04)	0.35
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Republican	Jobs	Yes	No	0.08	(0.04)	0.03	0.08	(0.04)	0.03
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Republican	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.04	(0.04)	0.24	0.04	(0.03)	0.29
No Chance for Education to Rise Out of Poverty	Republican	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.08	(0.04)	0.02	0.07	(0.04)	0.04
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	All	Housing	Yes	No	0.03	(0.02)	0.09	0.03	(0.02)	0.08
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	All	Jobs	Yes	No	0.03	(0.02)	0.03	0.03	(0.02)	0.03
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	All	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.03	(0.02)	0.09	0.03	(0.02)	0.06
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	All	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.03	(0.02)	0.03	0.03	(0.02)	0.03
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Democrat	Housing	Yes	No	0.02	(0.02)	0.37	0.02	(0.02)	0.36
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	No	0.03	(0.02)	0.25	0.03	(0.02)	0.25
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Democrat	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.02)	0.36	0.04	(0.04)	0.30
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.02)	0.51	0.03	(0.04)	0.47
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Independent	Housing	Yes	No	0.04	(0.04)	0.33	0.04	(0.03)	0.30
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Independent	Jobs	Yes	No	0.05	(0.03)	0.15	0.05	(0.03)	0.14
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Independent	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.04	(0.04)	0.24	0.04	(0.03)	0.23
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Independent	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.05	(0.04)	0.15	0.04	(0.03)	0.16
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Republican	Housing	Yes	No	0.02	(0.03)	0.37	0.02	(0.03)	0.35
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Republican	Jobs	Yes	No	0.03	(0.03)	0.24	0.03	(0.03)	0.23
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Republican	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.02)	0.40	0.02	(0.02)	0.33
Less In-Born Ability to Learn among Black People	Republican	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.03	(0.02)	0.20	0.03	(0.02)	0.17
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	All	Housing	Yes	No	-0.02	(0.02)	0.30	-0.02	(0.02)	0.29
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	All	Jobs	Yes	No	0.01	(0.02)	0.74	0.01	(0.02)	0.74
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	All	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.03	(0.02)	0.19	-0.03	(0.02)	0.18
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	All	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.00	(0.02)	0.90	0.00	(0.02)	0.91
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Democrat	Housing	Yes	No	0.00	(0.03)	1.00	0.00	(0.03)	1.00
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	No	0.03	(0.03)	0.28	0.03	(0.03)	0.29
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Democrat	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.00	(0.03)	0.89	0.01	(0.04)	0.83
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.03)	0.51	0.03	(0.04)	0.47
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Independent	Housing	Yes	No	-0.13	(0.06)	0.03	-0.13	(0.05)	0.02
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Independent	Jobs	Yes	No	-0.01	(0.05)	0.86	-0.01	(0.06)	0.87
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Independent	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.13	(0.06)	0.03	-0.14	(0.06)	0.02
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Independent	Jobs	Yes	Yes	-0.01	(0.06)	0.80	-0.02	(0.06)	0.77
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Republican	Housing	Yes	No	-0.06	(0.04)	0.13	-0.06	(0.04)	0.13
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Republican	Jobs	Yes	No	-0.05	(0.04)	0.18	-0.05	(0.04)	0.18
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Republican	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.05	(0.04)	0.18	-0.05	(0.04)	0.18
No Motivation or Willpower among Black People	Republican	Jobs	Yes	Yes	-0.04	(0.04)	0.25	-0.04	(0.04)	0.27
Family Instability in Black Community	All	Housing	Yes	No	-0.02	(0.03)	0.43	-0.02	(0.03)	0.43
Family Instability in Black Community	All	Jobs	Yes	No	0.03	(0.03)	0.23	0.03	(0.03)	0.23
Family Instability in Black Community	All	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.02	(0.02)	0.36	-0.02	(0.02)	0.36
Family Instability in Black Community	All	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.03	(0.02)	0.26	0.03	(0.02)	0.26
Family Instability in Black Community	Democrat	Housing	Yes	No	-0.05	(0.04)	0.22	-0.05	(0.04)	0.22
Family Instability in Black Community	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	No	-0.02	(0.04)	0.62	-0.02	(0.04)	0.62
Family Instability in Black Community	Democrat	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.03	(0.04)	0.45	-0.03	(0.04)	0.45
Family Instability in Black Community	Democrat	Jobs	Yes	Yes	-0.01	(0.04)	0.71	-0.01	(0.04)	0.74
Family Instability in Black Community	Independent	Housing	Yes	No	-0.13	(0.06)	0.04	-0.13	(0.06)	0.03
Family Instability in Black Community	Independent	Jobs	Yes	No	-0.02	(0.06)	0.71	-0.02	(0.06)	0.71
Family Instability in Black Community	Independent	Housing	Yes	Yes	-0.11	(0.06)	0.08	-0.11	(0.06)	0.08
Family Instability in Black Community	Independent	Jobs	Yes	Yes	-0.02	(0.06)	0.77	-0.02	(0.06)	0.79
Family Instability in Black Community	Republican	Housing	Yes	No	0.02	(0.04)	0.66	0.02	(0.04)	0.66
Family Instability in Black Community	Republican	Jobs	Yes	No	0.08	(0.04)	0.05	0.08	(0.04)	0.05
Family Instability in Black Community	Republican	Housing	Yes	Yes	0.02	(0.04)	0.54	0.02	(0.04)	0.55
Family Instability in Black Community	Republican	Jobs	Yes	Yes	0.08	(0.04)	0.05	0.08	(0.04)	0.04

Cells contain average treatment effects estimated using OLS and logistic regression.
Outcome is coded as a binary variable, 1=Yes, 0=No/Don't know.
Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S17. Logistic Regression Models of Binomial Counts – Estimates of Treatment Effects on Proportion of Structural or Individual/Cultural Belief Items where Subjects Respond 'Yes', among White Americans

		Structural Causes			Individual/Cultural Causes		
Sample	Treatment	Estimate	(SE)	p-value	Estimate	(SE)	p-value
All	housing	0.057	(0.017)	<0.01	-0.009	(0.013)	0.51
All	jobs	0.045	(0.016)	0.01	0.02	(0.013)	0.14
Democrat	housing	0.022	(0.026)	0.39	0	(0.019)	0.98
Democrat	jobs	0.038	(0.026)	0.13	0.008	(0.019)	0.67
Independent	housing	0.156	(0.044)	<0.01	-0.063	(0.031)	0.04
Independent	jobs	0.03	(0.041)	0.46	0.008	(0.032)	0.79
Republican	housing	0.081	(0.024)	<0.01	-0.003	(0.022)	0.91
Republican	jobs	0.073	(0.024)	<0.01	0.021	(0.022)	0.32

Cells contain average marginal effects estimated using logistic regression with covariate adjustment.

Pre-treatment covariates included in models with controls are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.

Table S18. Predicted Mean Outcomes and Between-Party Differences, by Experimental Condition and Sample Definition (Overall and by Party among White Americans)

	Experimental	Predicted Mean Outcome				Between-Party Differences		
Outcome	Condition	All	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Ind - Dem	Rep - Dem	Rep - Ind
Existence of Black-White Racial Inequality	control	0.626 (0.016)	0.799 (0.020)	0.509 (0.037)	0.415 (0.026)	-0.290 (0.042) **	-0.383 (0.033) **	-0.093 (0.045) **
Existence of Black-White Racial Inequality	housing	0.707 (0.016)	0.695 (0.022)	0.748 (0.037)	0.613 (0.025)	0.053 (0.043) ns	-0.082 (0.033) **	-0.135 (0.045) **
Existence of Black-White Racial Inequality	jobs	0.573 (0.016)	0.796 (0.020)	0.484 (0.040)	0.434 (0.025)	-0.312 (0.045) **	-0.362 (0.032) **	-0.051 (0.047) ns
Racial Resentment Score	control	0.144 (0.032)	-0.512 (0.047)	0.348 (0.073)	0.817 (0.047)	0.860 (0.087) **	1.329 (0.067) **	0.468 (0.087) **
Racial Resentment Score	housing	0.055 (0.034)	-0.167 (0.050)	-0.082 (0.081)	0.610 (0.046)	0.086 (0.095) ns	0.777 (0.068) **	0.691 (0.093) **
Racial Resentment Score	jobs	0.289 (0.033)	-0.194 (0.051)	0.319 (0.079)	0.745 (0.045)	0.513 (0.094) **	0.939 (0.068) **	0.426 (0.090) **
Belief in Structural Causes Index	control	0.431 (0.013)	0.647 (0.019)	0.353 (0.029)	0.183 (0.019)	-0.294 (0.035) **	-0.464 (0.027) **	-0.170 (0.035) **
Belief in Structural Causes Index	housing	0.490 (0.014)	0.527 (0.020)	0.512 (0.033)	0.340 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.039) ns	-0.187 (0.028) **	-0.173 (0.039) **
Belief in Structural Causes Index	jobs	0.422 (0.013)	0.592 (0.020)	0.382 (0.035)	0.296 (0.019)	-0.210 (0.041) **	-0.295 (0.027) **	-0.085 (0.040) **
Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes Index	control	0.292 (0.010)	0.231 (0.014)	0.260 (0.021)	0.366 (0.016)	0.030 (0.025) ns	0.136 (0.021) **	0.106 (0.027) **
Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes Index	housing	0.282 (0.011)	0.181 (0.016)	0.192 (0.025)	0.366 (0.016)	0.011 (0.029) ns	0.185 (0.022) **	0.174 (0.029) **
Belief in Individual/Cultural Causes Index	jobs	0.305 (0.011)	0.274 (0.016)	0.265 (0.026)	0.361 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.031) ns	0.088 (0.023) **	0.097 (0.031) **

Cells contain predicted mean outcomes adjusted for pre-treatment covariates and study fixed effects used in the primary specification. Standard errors in parentheses.
Pre-treatment covariates are age, age squared divided by 100, gender, education, urbanicity, income, region, political interest, ideology, religion, born again identification.
** $p<0.05$

D Research Ethics Statement

This study is approved by the Yale Human Subjects Committee (Protocol #1312013102). Participants were not compensated directly by the researchers. Respondent providers working with Lucid choose to incentivize participants in a variety of ways consistent with their respective business models; these incentives include both monetary and non-monetary incentives that participants agreed to when they joined the panel provider that Lucid works with. As Lucid's website notes: "Each incentive program is unique. Some suppliers do not incentivize their respondents at all, most provide loyalty reward points or gift cards, and some provide cash payments. Lucid does not control the incentivization models of our suppliers, as that's part of their individual business models. The method of incentivization also varies; for instance, some suppliers use the survey's CPI to calculate incentive, others LOI, or a combination of the two. Each respondent agrees to their panel's specific incentivization method when they join." (`https://support.lucidhq.com/s/article/Sample-Sourcing-FAQs`)

Participants were shown an IRB-approved informed consent form as the first question in the survey (prior to the beginning of the study), were informed that their participation was completely voluntary, and that they could opt out of the study at that point (i.e., through the informed consent form) or at any point during the study. Participants were also informed that all of their identifying information and choices will be kept confidential, and that there are no known risks associated with this study beyond those associated with everyday life. Furthermore, participants were given the contact information for the investigators and for the IRB if they had questions about the research, its procedures, or its risks and benefits; if they were not satisfied with how the study was being conducted; or they had any concerns, complaints, or general questions about their rights as a participant. Participants who did not agree to participate through the informed consent page were exited out of the study immediately after the informed consent page.

Both studies use diverse, general population samples of U.S. adults. Because we recruit U.S. adult general population samples, the participant pools, study population of interest, and

study samples are not comprised primarily of vulnerable or marginalized groups; moreover, all participants were able to opt out of the study at any time. Our research did not differentially benefit/harm particular groups.