Supplemental Appendix for:

THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS ON TURNOUT OF POSITIVELY VERSUS NEGATIVELY FRAMED DESCRIPTIVE NORMS IN MOBILIZATION CAMPAIGNS

FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY

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A Supplemental Appendix for Study 1: Experiment Involving a Social Referent and Descriptive Norms (2014 Primary Election among Contacted Ever-Voters in MI, MO, TN)

A.1 Treatment Scripts

FOR ALL SUBJECTS:

VAR1 - STATE
VAR2 - DAY
VAR3 - DATE
VAR4 - 2012 TURNOUT
VAR5 - 2012 NON-VOTERS

Hi, could I speak to [name1] *or* [name2]*?* (please enter id number of target reached)

Hi. My name is [interviewer's first name]*, and I'm conducting a university research survey of registered voters. You can help us a lot by answering just a few questions. The survey is voluntary and you don't have to answer questions you don't want to. I'm not selling anything, and the entire questionnaire will take fewer than two minutes to complete.*

Are you currently a resident of [VAR1]?

01	Yes:	GO TO APPROPRIATE GROUPCODE SECTION
02	No:	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
03	Other:	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
04	Wouldn't Disclose:	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
20	Declined Conversation:	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
21	Do not call:	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

FDISPS 30-86 ARE FINALIZED RECORDS BUT DON'T COUNT AS CONTACTS

30	Early Hangup	[enter ID1 into ID field]
31	Language Barrier	[enter ID1 into ID field]
32	Target Deceased	[enter ID1 into ID field]
35	Privacy Manager	[enter ID1 into ID field]
80	Wrong Number	[enter ID1 into ID field]
81	Disconnected Number	[enter ID1 into ID field]
82	Fax/Modem	[enter ID1 into ID field]
83	Fast Busy	[enter ID1 into ID field]
84	Telephony Error/Circuits Busy	[enter ID1 into ID field]
85	Changed Number	[enter ID1 into ID field]
86	Tri-tone/No longer in service (catch all)	[enter ID1 into ID field]

GROUPCODE 01 (Placebo):

Q01 (S1Q1) *How many times in the last fourteen days have you been to the grocery store?*

1	Response provided [do not record response]	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
96	Other	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
97	Don't know	GO TO Q02
98	Refused	GO TO Q02
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

Q02 (S1Q1a) *If you had to guess, how many times in the last fourteen days have you been to the grocery store?*

1	Response provided [do not record response]	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
97	Don't know	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
98	Refused	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

GROUPCODE 06 (Positive descriptive social norms):

Q28 (S6Q1) *This* [VAR2] [VAR1] *will be holding primary elections to select which candidates will be on the ballot this November. Were you aware that* [VAR1]*'s primary elections will be held this* [VAR2]*?*

1	Yes	GO TO Q29
2	No	GO TO Q29
96	Other	GO TO Q29
98	Refused	GO TO Q29
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

Q29 (S6Q2) *In the 2012 primary election,* [VAR4] *of* [VAR1]*'s eligible voters actually voted. Many hope this high level of engagement will continue in the upcoming primary election on* [VAR2]*. We encourage you to continue this high level of participation and vote!*

(S6Q3) *In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to vote because they are sick, they have important obligations, or they just don't have time. How likely do you think you are to vote in the primary election this coming* [VAR2]*?*

[IF NECESSARY, PROD WITH:] *Are you ...*

[START LISTING OPTIONS 1-6 – DO NOT READ 96-99]

1	Absolutely certain to vote	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
2	Extremely likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
3	Very likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
4	Somewhat likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
5	Not too likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
6	Not at all likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
96	Other	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
97	Don't know	GO TO Q30
98	Refused	GO TO Q30
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

Q30 (S6Q3a) *If you had to guess, how likely do you think you are to vote in the election this coming* [VAR2]*?*

[IF NECESSARY, PROD WITH:] *Are you ...*

[START LISTING OPTIONS 1-6 – DO NOT READ 96-99]

1	Absolutely certain to vote	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
2	Extremely likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
3	Very likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
4	Somewhat likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
5	Not too likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
6	Not at all likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
96	Other	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
97	Don't know	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
98	Refused	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

GROUPCODE 07 (Negative descriptive social norms):

Q31 (S7Q1) *This* [VAR2] [VAR1] *will be holding primary elections to select which candidates will be on the ballot this November. Were you aware that* [VAR1]*'s primary elections will be held this* [VAR2]*?*

1	Yes	GO TO Q32
2	No	GO TO Q32
96	Other	GO TO Q32
98	Refused	GO TO Q32
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

Q32 (S7Q2) *In the 2012 primary election,* [VAR5] *of* [VAR1]*'s eligible voters did not actually vote. Many fear this low level of engagement will continue in the upcoming primary election on* [VAR2]*. We encourage you to break from this low level of participation and vote!*

(S7Q3) *In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to vote*

because they are sick, they have important obligations, or they just don't have time. How likely do you think you are to vote in the primary election this coming [VAR2]*?*

[IF NECESSARY, PROD WITH:] *Are you...*

[START LISTING OPTIONS 1-6 – DO NOT READ 96-99]

1	Absolutely certain to vote	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
2	Extremely likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
3	Very likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
4	Somewhat likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
5	Not too likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
6	Not at all likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
96	Other	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
97	Don't know	GO TO Q33
98	Refused	GO TO Q33
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

Q33 (S7Q3a) *If you had to guess, how likely do you think you are to vote in the election this coming* [VAR2]*?*

[IF NECESSARY, PROD WITH:] *Are you...*

[START LISTING OPTIONS 1-6 – DO NOT READ 96-99]

1	Absolutely certain to vote	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
2	Extremely likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
3	Very likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
4	Somewhat likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
5	Not too likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
6	Not at all likely	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
96	Other	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
97	Don't know	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
98	Refused	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*
99	Hung up	*Thank you for your help. Goodbye.*

A.2 Sample Filtering and Definition Details

The subject pool in the original experiment was defined using the following procedure. First we obtained a sampling frame of 15,378,656 registrants from a private vendor for the three states. There were 7,381,393 registrants in MI, 4,039,314 registrants in MO, and 3,957,949 registrants in TN.

We then excluded records that lacked a first or last name or a valid phone number because treatments are phone calls targeting specific individuals that must be matched back to voter files. We required that the phone number be connected with greater than 60% probability and be able to match to a person with greater than 80% probability. We also excluded any duplicate phone numbers that remained after randomly selecting subjects from each household.

We also excluded records who could not be matched to a congressional district. Finally, we randomly selected one registrant from each household for the experimental sample. This yields a sample of 2,122,738 subjects. Next, we used a blocked randomization procedure, blocking on subjects' state of residence, past vote history, and the competitiveness of their congressional district (specifically, whether the congressional district has either a competitive Democratic or Republican primary election), to assign subjects to receive the positive norm treatment call (n=25,274), the negative norm treatment call (n=25,276), or the apolitical placebo call (n=50,557).

To construct the analysis sample, we further condition the sample on whether the subject was successfully reached and whether they verified their state of residence. This yields 4,406 subjects assigned to placebo, 2,105 subjects assigned to the positive norm condition, and 2,112 subjects assigned to the negative norm condition.

A.3 Treatment Assignment Probabilities by Randomization Block/Stratum

Table A1: Treatment assignment probabilities by block for the original experimental sample (left panel) and among the analysis sample, defined as subjects who are succesfully contacted and pass the screener verifying their state of residence (right panel). Blocks are defined as unique combinations of the subject's state of residence, the subject's district type (specifically whether either the Republican or Democratic primary election is competitive), and the subject's past vote history.

Randomization Block / Stratum				Treatment Assignment Rates among Original Subject Pool								Treatment Assignment Rates in Analysis Sample							
Block/ Stratum Number	State	Either Primary Competitive?	Voter Type by Past Vote History (G=General Election Voters V=Primary Election Voters)	Placebo		Positive Norm		Negative Norm		Total		Placebo		Positive Norm		Negative Norm		Total	
				N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1	MI	No	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	2,657	50.01	1,328	25	1,328	25	5,313	100	163	48.37	91	27	83	24.63	337	100
2	MI	No	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	2,596	50	1,298	25	1,298	25	5,192	100	159	45.43	92	26.29	99	28.29	350	100
3	MI	No	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	277	50.09	138	24.95	138	24.95	553	100	22	42.31	17	32.69	13	25	52	100
4	MI	No	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	1,519	49.97	760	25	761	25.03	3,040	100	167	52.68	68	21.45	82	25.87	317	100
5	MI	Yes	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	6,802	50	3,401	25	3,401	25	13,604	100	403	49.57	208	25.58	202	24.85	813	100
6	MI	Yes	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	7,054	49.99	3,528	25	3,528	25	14,110	100	503	50.5	266	26.71	227	22.79	996	100
7	MI	Yes	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	720	50	360	25	360	25	1,440	100	45	44.12	28	27.45	29	28.43	102	100
8	MI	Yes	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	4,383	50	2,191	24.99	2,192	25.01	8,766	100	401	48.78	208	25.3	213	25.91	822	100
9	MO	No	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	3,557	50.01	1,778	25	1,777	24.99	7,112	100	263	48.52	139	25.65	140	25.83	542	100
10	MO	No	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	2,995	50.01	1,497	25	1,497	25	5,989	100	274	48.93	141	25.18	145	25.89	560	100
11	MO	No	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	664	50.08	331	24.96	331	24.96	1,326	100	65	47.79	39	28.68	32	23.53	136	100
12	MO	No	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	2,959	50.01	1,479	25	1,479	25	5,917	100	443	49.89	226	25.45	219	24.66	888	100
13	TN	No	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	2,097	49.99	1,049	25.01	1,049	25.01	4,195	100	195	46.43	93	22.14	132	31.43	420	100
14	TN	No	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	1,353	50	677	25.02	676	24.98	2,706	100	165	49.85	78	23.56	88	26.59	331	100
15	TN	No	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	442	50	221	25	221	25	884	100	78	50.32	37	23.87	40	25.81	155	100
16	TN	No	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	1,831	50	916	25.01	915	24.99	3,662	100	314	47.87	172	26.22	170	25.91	656	100
17	TN	Yes	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	1,183	50.06	590	24.97	590	24.97	2,363	100	115	51.11	59	26.22	51	22.67	225	100
18	TN	Yes	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	726	49.93	363	24.97	365	25.1	1,454	100	86	49.14	47	26.86	42	24	175	100
19	TN	Yes	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	183	50.41	90	24.79	90	24.79	363	100	19	48.72	10	25.64	10	25.64	39	100
20	TN	Yes	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	1,028	49.98	514	24.99	515	25.04	2,057	100	166	47.84	86	24.78	95	27.38	347	100
Total				45,026	50	22,509	25	22,511	25	90,046	100	4,046	48.97	2,105	25.48	2,112	25.56	8,263	100

A.4 Additional Tables

Table A2: Estimated Effect of Positive and Negative Descriptive Norm Treatments on Turnout in the 2014 Primary Election, Relative to Placebo

Variable	(1) Weighted and with Covariates	(2) Weighted and without Covariates	(3) Not Weighted and with Covariates	(4) Not Weighted and without Covariates
Positive Descriptive Norm	0.024**	0.022*	0.024**	0.022*
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Negative Descriptive Norm	0.022**	0.034***	0.022**	0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Constant	-0.063**	0.322***	-0.048*	0.322***
	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.007)
Observations	8,263	8,263	8,263	8,263
Weighted?	Y	Y	N	N
With Covariates?	Y	N	Y	N
With State Fixed Effects?	Y	N	Y	N
With State-by-Covariate Interactions?	Y	N	Y	N
Placebo Group Mean Turnout	0.322	0.322	0.322	0.322
Estimated Difference in Mean Effects (Positive - Negative Norms)	0.00164	-0.0116	0.00162	-0.0116
Estimated SE of the Difference in Mean Effects (Positive - Negative Norms)	0.0117	0.0147	0.0117	0.0147
P-Value: Null Hypothesis that Diff. in Mean Effects of Positive and Negative Norms is Zero	0.889	0.428	0.890	0.428

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The omitted treatment category is the placebo group. Covariates not shown include age on Election Day in years, gender, race, years since registration date, missing years since registration date, the total number of past general elections, primary elections, and special elections in which the subject voted, state fixed effects, and state-by-covariate interactions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3: Number of Subjects by Treatment Arm and by State for Study 1

	Michigan		Missouri		Tennessee		Total	
Treatment Arm	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Placebo	1,863	49.17	1,045	49.15	1,138	48.47	4,046	48.97
Positive Descriptive Norm	978	25.81	545	25.63	582	24.79	2,105	25.48
Negative Descriptive Norm	948	25.02	536	25.21	628	26.75	2,112	25.56
Total	3,789	100	2,126	100	2,348	100	8,263	100

Table A4: Randomization Check for Study 1. We infer that the randomization procedure is valid because we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the covariates are jointly prognostic of treatment assignment (LR test χ^2(df=28)=19.81, p=0.87).

Variable	(1) Positive Descriptive Norm	(2) Negative Descriptive Norm
State=Missouri	0.008	-0.005
	(0.068)	(0.068)
State=Tennessee	-0.033	0.063
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Election day age (in years)	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender=Male (1=yes)	0.055	0.048
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Gender=Unknown (1=yes)	-0.449	-0.877
	(0.521)	(0.636)
Race=Black (Yes = 1)	0.040	-0.052
	(0.091)	(0.093)
Race=Latino (Yes = 1)	-0.179	-0.209
	(0.285)	(0.291)
Race=Unknown (Yes = 1)	-0.211	-1.302
	(0.691)	(1.070)
Race=Other (Yes = 1)	-0.043	-0.572
	(0.217)	(0.263)**
Years Since Registration Date	-0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Years Since Registration Date Missing	0.023	0.261
	(0.304)	(0.285)
Total General Election Votes	0.001	0.011
	(0.035)	(0.036)
Total Primary Election Votes	0.008	0.009
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Total Special Election Votes	-0.027	-0.014
	(0.039)	(0.038)
Constant	-0.594	-0.718
	(0.137)***	(0.138)***
Observations	8,263	
LR Test Chi-Square	19.81	
LR Test p-value	0.871	

Cells contain estimated coefficients from a multinomial logit regression of treatment assignment on observed covariates, with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted base category of the dependent variable is the placebo group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5: Balance Table for Study 1

	Treatment Arm		
Variable	Placebo	Positive Descriptive Norm	Negative Descriptive Norm
State=Michigan	0.4605	0.4646	0.4488
	[.4985]	[.4989]	[.4975]
State=Missouri	0.2582	0.2589	0.2539
	[.4377]	[.4382]	[.4353]
State=Tennessee	0.2813	0.2765	0.2973
	[.4497]	[.4474]	[.4572]
Election day age (in years)	62.3237	61.9852	62.5565
	[15.6343]	[15.712]	[15.5521]
Gender=Male (1=yes)	0.4058	0.4204	0.4176
	[.4911]	[.4937]	[.4933]
Gender=Unknown (1=yes)	0.0037	0.0024	0.0014
	[.0608]	[.0487]	[.0377]
Race=Black (Yes = 1)	0.0969	0.0998	0.0933
	[.2958]	[.2998]	[.2909]
Race=Latino (Yes = 1)	0.0101	0.0086	0.008
	[.1002]	[.0921]	[.0894]
Race=Unknown (Yes = 1)	0.0017	0.0014	0.0005
	[.0416]	[.0377]	[.0218]
Race=Other (Yes = 1)	0.0161	0.0157	0.009
	[.1257]	[.1243]	[.0944]
Years Since Registration Date	21.3	20.9915	21.706
	[13.9153]	[14.0789]	[14.163]
Years Since Registration Date Missing	0.0079	0.0081	0.0099
	[.0886]	[.0895]	[.0993]
Total General Election Votes	2.4902	2.4845	2.5042
	[.9061]	[.8951]	[.8958]
Total Primary Election Votes	1.1753	1.1653	1.2172
	[1.6459]	[1.6306]	[1.6795]
Total Special Election Votes	0.4605	0.4447	0.462
	[.8582]	[.8335]	[.856]
Observations	4046	2105	2112

Cells contain weighted means and weighted standard deviations in brackets.

Table A6: Logit regression of contact and passing the screener question verifying state of residence on treatment assignment, without and with randomization block fixed effects.

Variable	(1) Without Block Fixed Effects	(2) With Block Fixed Effects
Positive Descriptive Norm	0.044	0.045
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Negative Descriptive Norm	0.048	0.048
	(0.028)*	(0.028)*
Constant	-2.315	-2.716
	(0.016)***	(0.058)***
Observations	90,046	90,046
LR Test Chi-Square	3.934	3.980
LR Test p-value	0.140	0.140

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7: Proportion of subjects successfully contacted and passed screener question verifying state of residence by treatment arm and by randomization block/stratum.

Randomization Block / Stratum				Percent Contacted and Passed Screener			
Block/ Stratum Number	State	Either Primary Competitive?	Voter Type by Past Vote History (G=General Election Voters V=Primary Election Voters)	By Treatment Group Negative	Placebo	Positive	Total
1	MI	No	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	6.25	6.13	6.85	6.34
2	MI	No	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	7.63	6.12	7.09	6.74
3	MI	No	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	9.42	7.94	12.32	9.4
4	MI	No	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	10.78	10.99	8.95	10.43
5	MI	Yes	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	5.94	5.92	6.12	5.98
6	MI	Yes	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	6.43	7.13	7.54	7.06
7	MI	Yes	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	8.06	6.25	7.78	7.08
8	MI	Yes	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	9.72	9.15	9.49	9.38
9	MO	No	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	7.88	7.39	7.82	7.62
10	MO	No	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	9.69	9.15	9.42	9.35
11	MO	No	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	9.67	9.79	11.78	10.26
12	MO	No	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	14.81	14.97	15.28	15.01
13	TN	No	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	12.58	9.3	8.87	10.01
14	TN	No	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	13.02	12.2	11.52	12.23
15	TN	No	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	18.1	17.65	16.74	17.53
16	TN	No	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	18.58	17.15	18.78	17.91
17	TN	Yes	G (Only Pres. Elec.)	8.64	9.72	10	9.52
18	TN	Yes	G (Any Non-Pres. Elec.)	11.51	11.85	12.95	12.04
19	TN	Yes	P (Just Pres. Prim.)	11.11	10.38	11.11	10.74
20	TN	Yes	P (Any Non-Pres. Prim.)	18.45	16.15	16.73	16.87

B Supplemental Appendix for Study 2: Experiment Involving a Self Referent and Information about Subjects' Past Voting Behavior (2014 General Election among Intermittent Voters in MS)

B.1 Treatment Mailing

Figure A1: Treatment Mailing Design Template. The key variation distinguishing the positive social pressure treatment mailer and the negative social pressure treatment mailer occurs below the box displaying the subject's past voting record. The positive social pressure treatment states "We noticed you voted" whereas the negative social pressure treatment states "We noticed you didn't vote."

WHETHER OR NOT YOU VOTE IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD

Dear {{firstname}},

This year we wanted to remind you that voting is a matter of **public record.**

The chart below shows your name from the list of registered voters, indicating recent vote history and a question mark for this November's general election.

Voting Record of {{firstname lastname}}

Nov 2008	Nov 2010	Nov 2011	Nov 2012	**Nov 2014**
{{nov_08_vote}}	{{nov_10_vote}}	{{nov_11_vote}}	{{nov_12_vote}}	**?**

{{We noticed you voted/didn't vote in November XX}}. We hope to see you this Tuesday, November 4th.

Alfred Johnson, President
Mississippi Center for Voter Information

P.S. We may call you after the election to hear about your voting experience. We are interested in what voting on Tuesday will be like for you.

B.2 Sample Filtering and Definition Details

The subject pool was defined using the following procedure. First, the consulting firm provided us with a sampling frame of 830,495 registrants who were intermittent voters and members of selected subgroups that they wished to target in the election.[1] We then excluded households without a valid mailing address because treatments were delivered by mail. We also excluded registrants for whom the date of voter registration is unknown because we would not be able to adduce whether they were an intermittent voter. We then deduplicated records by a unique person-specific identification number, retaining one record for each registrant from the most reliable voter list available. Finally, we randomly sampled one registrant from each household remaining in the sampling frame, yielding a sample of 244,940 subjects.

B.3 Additional Tables and Figures

Table A8: Estimated Effect of Positive and Negative Social Pressure Treatments on Turnout in the 2014 General Election

Variable	(1) Weighted and with Covariates	(2) Weighted and without Covariates	(3) Not Weighted and with Covariates	(4) Not Weighted and without Covariates
Positive Social Pressure	0.031***	0.033***	0.032***	0.033***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Negative Social Pressure	0.037***	0.035***	0.037***	0.035***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.180***	0.269***	0.177***	0.269***
	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Observations	224,940	224,940	224,940	224,940
Weighted?	Y	Y	N	N
With Covariates?	Y	N	Y	N
Control Group Mean Turnout	0.269	0.269	0.269	0.269
Estimated Difference in Mean Effects: (Positive - Negative Social Pressure)	-0.00560	-0.00200	-0.00553	-0.00200
Estimated SE of the Difference in Mean Effects: (Positive - Negative Social Pressure)	0.00721	0.00777	0.00722	0.00777
P-Value: Null Hypothesis that Diff. in Mean Effects of Positive and Negative Social Pressure is Zero	0.437	0.797	0.443	0.797

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The omitted treatment category is the control group. Covariates not shown include age in years (imputing sample mean if missing), missing age, sex, race, and dummy variables capturing prior vote history in 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[1]The groups targeted by the firm were: (1) African Americans in Hinds County, MS, who participated at least once in the 2008, 2010 or 2012 general elections and did not vote in any Republican primary election, and (2) anyone who voted at least once in the 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012 general elections and who did not vote in any Republican primary election.

Table A9: Number of Subjects by Treatment Arm for Study 2

Treatment Arm	N	Percent
Control	210,940	93.78
Positive Social Pressure	7,000	3.11
Negative Social Pressure	7,000	3.11
Total	224,940	100

Table A10: Randomization Check for Study 2. We infer that the randomization procedure is valid because we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the covariates are jointly prognostic of treatment assignment (LR test χ^2(df=54)=55.99, p=0.4).

Variable	(1) Positive Social Pressure	(2) Negative Social Pressure
Age in Years (impute sample mean if missing)	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Missing Age (1=Yes)	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Sex=Female (1=Yes)	0.045	0.009
	(0.026)*	(0.025)
Sex=Unknown (1=Yes)	0.033	-0.127
	(0.058)	(0.061)**
Race=Black (1=Yes)	0.024	0.003
	(0.043)	(0.042)
Race=Other or Unknown (1=Yes)	0.056	-0.033
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, N, Y, N	-0.038	0.133
	(0.178)	(0.168)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, N, Y, Y	-0.014	0.015
	(0.102)	(0.103)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, N, N	0.061	-0.306
	(0.140)	(0.167)*
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, N, Y	0.067	-0.069
	(0.107)	(0.115)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, Y, N	-0.042	0.192
	(0.214)	(0.197)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, Y, Y	0.004	0.039
	(0.080)	(0.081)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, N, N	-0.049	0.113
	(0.062)	(0.062)*
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, N, Y	-0.003	0.040
	(0.059)	(0.060)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, Y, N	-0.015	-0.032
	(0.098)	(0.100)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, Y, Y	0.008	0.031
	(0.060)	(0.061)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, Y, N, N	0.019	-0.106
	(0.091)	(0.097)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, Y, N, Y	-0.026	0.024
	(0.063)	(0.064)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, Y, Y, N	-0.061	-0.123
	(0.092)	(0.096)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, N, N, Y	-0.068	0.129
	(0.110)	(0.107)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, N, Y, N	0.017	-0.030
	(0.364)	(0.388)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, N, Y, Y	-0.036	-0.189
	(0.176)	(0.196)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, Y, N, N	0.224	0.593
	(0.247)	(0.217)***
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, Y, N, Y	-0.009	-0.172
	(0.188)	(0.210)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, Y, Y, N	-0.106	-0.540
	(0.457)	(0.585)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, NA, N, Y	-0.115	0.105
	(0.097)	(0.094)
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, NA, Y, N	-0.285	-0.013
	(0.267)	(0.246)
Constant	-3.531	-3.394
	(0.088)***	(0.088)***
Observations	224,940	
LR Test Chi-Square	55.99	
LR Test p-value	0.400	

Cells contain estimated coefficients from a multinomial logit regression of treatment assignment on observed covariates, with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted base category of the dependent variable is the control group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A11: Balance Table for Study 2

	Treatment Arm		
Variable	Control	Positive Social Pressure	Negative Social Pressure
Age in Years (impute sample mean if missing)	56.1102	56.2652	56.0573
	[12.1418]	[12.0465]	[12.3752]
Missing Age (1=Yes)	0.4086	0.4101	0.4031
	[.4916]	[.4919]	[.4906]
Sex=Female (1=Yes)	0.5637	0.5744	0.5689
	[.4959]	[.4945]	[.4953]
Sex=Unknown (1=Yes)	0.0525	0.0526	0.0464
	[.2231]	[.2232]	[.2104]
Race=Black (1=Yes)	0.1991	0.1967	0.2041
	[.3993]	[.3975]	[.4031]
Race=Other or Unknown (1=Yes)	0.6556	0.662	0.6479
	[.4752]	[.4731]	[.4777]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, N, Y, N	0.0053	0.0051	0.0059
	[.0725]	[.0715]	[.0763]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, N, Y, Y	0.0195	0.0194	0.0191
	[.1381]	[.138]	[.137]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, N, N	0.0082	0.0089	0.0059
	[.0904]	[.0937]	[.0763]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, N, Y	0.0158	0.0171	0.0143
	[.1248]	[.1298]	[.1187]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, Y, N	0.0035	0.0034	0.0041
	[.0593]	[.0585]	[.0642]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: N, Y, Y, Y	0.0414	0.0421	0.0417
	[.1991]	[.2009]	[.1999]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, N, N	0.1525	0.1473	0.1643
	[.3595]	[.3544]	[.3706]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, N, Y	0.2326	0.2356	0.2337
	[.4225]	[.4244]	[.4232]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, Y, N	0.0222	0.0221	0.0209
	[.1474]	[.1472]	[.1429]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, N, Y, Y	0.1984	0.203	0.1987
	[.3988]	[.4023]	[.3991]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, Y, N, N	0.0264	0.0273	0.023
	[.1604]	[.1629]	[.1499]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, Y, N, Y	0.1361	0.1344	0.1353
	[.3429]	[.3411]	[.3421]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: Y, Y, Y, N	0.0276	0.0263	0.0237
	[.1638]	[.16]	[.1522]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, N, N, Y	0.0168	0.0161	0.018
	[.1287]	[.126]	[.133]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, N, Y, N	0.0011	0.0011	0.001
	[.0331]	[.0338]	[.0316]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, N, Y, Y	0.0053	0.0053	0.0041
	[.0729]	[.0725]	[.0642]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, Y, N, N	0.002	0.0026	0.0034
	[.0449]	[.0506]	[.0585]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, Y, N, Y	0.0045	0.0046	0.0036
	[.067]	[.0675]	[.0597]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, Y, Y, N	0.0008	0.0007	0.0004
	[.0279]	[.0267]	[.0207]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, NA, N, Y	0.0255	0.0233	0.0264
	[.1576]	[.1508]	[.1604]
Turnout in 2008, 10, 11, and 12 General Elections: NA, NA, Y, N	0.0028	0.0021	0.0026
	[.0528]	[.0462]	[.0506]
Observations	210940	7000	7000

Cells contain weighted means and weighted standard deviations in brackets.

In Study 2, the framing treatments may be weak in cases where subjects rarely voted but the treatment points out the one time they voted or in cases where subjects almost always vote but the treatment points out the one time they did not vote. To test whether this may be occurring, we assess whether there is variation in heterogeneous effects by the number of times subjects previously voted in the last four elections. Evidence of heterogeneity in differential effects would suggest that subjects' perception of their own past voting behavior is a function of an interaction between their actual vote history and their construal of how their past behavior is framed. Focusing on subjects who could have voted in the last four elections (n=211,716 of the 224,940 total subjects in Study 2), we find no evidence of differential framing effects in any subgroup defined by the number of times one voted in the last four elections (see Figure A2).

Figure A2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by the Number of Times Subject Voted in Last 4 Elections, Among Subjects who Could Vote in the Last 4 Elections. This figure plots each treatment effect (as compared to control) with 95% confidence intervals, by past vote history subgroup.



C Manipulation Checks (MTurk Survey Experiment)

C.1 Design and Procedures

We conducted manipulation checks for each of the field experimental manipulations from Study 1 and Study 2 using a follow-on survey experiment fielded on Amazon Mechanical Turk on January 17, 2018. We recruited 1206 Mechanical Turk workers and randomly assigned each to complete either a manipulation check for Study 1 (group referent, n=610) or a manipulation check for Study 2 (self referent, n=596).

C.1.1 Experimental Design of Manipulation Check for Study 1 (group referent)

Subjects who were assigned to the manipulation check for Study 1 were randomly assigned to receive the positively framed descriptive norm or the negatively framed descriptive norm, and were shown the following text:

> Suppose you lived in Texas and received the following message from a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose mission is to encourage greater political participation.
>
> [IF ASSIGNED TO POSITIVE FRAMED DESCRIPTIVE NORM:]
> In the 2016 general election, about 9 million eligible Texan citizens VOTED. Many hope this high level of engagement will continue in next year's general election. We encourage you to continue this high level of participation and vote!
>
> [IF ASSIGNED TO NEGATIVELY FRAMED DESCRIPTIVE NORM:]
> In the 2016 general election, about 9 million eligible Texan citizens DID NOT VOTE. Many fear this low level of engagement will continue in next year's general election. We encourage you to break from this low level of participation and vote!

Subjects were asked to imagine they were an eligible voter in Texas. We selected Texas because we wanted to pick a state where the number of eligible voters who voted was approximately the same as the number of eligible voters who did not vote.[2] This allows us to hold fixed the level of voters and non-voters across conditions without deceiving subjects.

On the same screen, subjects were then asked to answer two questions, with the order of the questions randomized:

[2] According to the United States Election Project, in the 2016 general election the turnout rate among the voting eligible population in Texas was 51.6%, which translates into about 9 million eligible Texans who voted and 9 million eligible Texans who did not vote. Source: `http://www.electproject.org/2016g`. Accessed 25 January 2018.

After receiving that message, how would you answer these two questions?

[RANDOMIZE to A or B] [A: If you had to guess, how likely do you think you would be to vote in the next general election in 2018?] [B: In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to vote because they are sick, they have important obligations, or they just don't have the time. If you had to guess, how likely do you think you would be to vote in the next general election in 2018?]

- Absolutely certain to vote
- Extremely likely
- Very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Not too likely
- Not at all likely

Which of the following best represents how you would characterize the level of turnout among eligible voters in Texas in the 2016 general election? The percentage of eligible voters who voted was...

- Extremely high
- High
- Somewhat high
- Somewhat low
- Low
- Extremely low

C.1.2 Experimental Design of Manipulation Check for Study 2 (self referent)

Subjects who were assigned to the manipulation check for Study 2 were randomly assigned to receive the positively framed descriptive norm or the negatively framed descriptive norm, and were shown the following text:

Suppose you received the following campaign mailer before the next general election in November 2018. The sender of the mailer is a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose mission is to encourage greater political participation.

WHETHER OR NOT YOU VOTE IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD

This year we wanted to remind you that voting is a matter of public record.

The chart below indicates your recent vote history and a question mark for the next general election.

Your Voting Record:

Nov 2012	Nov 2014	Nov 2015	Nov 2016	Nov 2018
{Y/N}	{Y/N}	{Y/N}	{Y/N}	?

We noticed YOU {VOTED / DIDN'T VOTE} in November {YEAR}.
We hope to see you at the polls on Tuesday, November 6, 2018.

P.S. We may call you after the election to hear about your voting experience. We are interested in what voting on Election Day will be like for you.

If the voting record shown in the chart was your voting record, how would you answer these two questions after receiving this piece of mail?

All subjects had vote histories where they voted in 2 of the prior 4 elections and did not vote in the other 2 elections, in order to hold fixed the frequency of one's prior voting and non-voting behavior. This also allows us to avoid the possibility of having a weak treatment in cases where they voted in 3 of the last 4 elections but the treatment emphasizes the 1 election in which they did not vote and in cases where the subject voted in 1 of the last 4 elections but the treatment emphasizes one of the 3 elections in which they did not vote. The combination of elections in which they voted and did not vote were randomized with equal probability. Conditional on assignment to the positively framed or negatively framed descriptive norm condition, the year in which they voted or didn't vote was randomly selected among the years for which their randomized vote history is consistent with the assigned direction of the descriptive norm framing.

Subjects were then asked the following questions on the same screen:

Which of the following statements best represents how you would characterize YOUR past voting behavior?

- I voted a lot

- I often voted
- I sometimes voted
- I rarely voted
- I very rarely voted

If you received this mailer, how likely do you think you would be to vote in the next general election in 2018?

- Absolutely certain to vote
- Extremely likely
- Very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Not too likely
- Not at all likely

C.1.3 Variables and Estimation

For both manipulation checks, the treatment variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if the subject is assigned to the positively framed descriptive norm treatment and 0 if the subject is assigned to the negatively framed descriptive norm treatment.

The main outcome variable of interest for both manipulation checks is the subject's descriptive norm perception. Specifically, for the manipulation check for Study 1 (group referent), the outcome variable is a 6-point scale measuring the subject's perception of the percentage of eligible Texan voters who voted in the 2016 general election [0=Extremely low; 1=Low; 2=Somewhat low; 3=Somewhat high; 4=High; 5=Extremely high]. For the manipulation check for Study 2 (self referent), the outcome variable is a 5-point scale measuring the subject's perception of the frequency of their own past voting behavior (as summarized in the treatment mailer) [0=I very rarely voted; 1=I rarely voted; 2=I sometimes voted; 3=I voted often; 4=I voted a lot].

Our primary analyses for the manipulation checks estimate the effect of being assigned to the positively framed descriptive norm (as opposed to the negatively framed descriptive norm) on subjects' perception of the descriptive norm. We estimate this quantity by regressing the outcome on treatment, without and with pre-treatment covariates to show that the result is unaffected by covariate adjustment. The pre-treatment covariates included in the model specification for both manipulation checks are: gender, age, 7-point party identification, state, highest level of educational attainment, ideology, level of political interest, social class identification, citizenship status, and household income level in 2017.

We also collected subjects' stated likelihood of voting as an ancillary outcome measure. This vari-

able is measured on a 6-point scale [0=Not at all likely; 1=Not too likely; 2=Somewhat likely; 3=Very likely; 4=Extremely likely; 5=Absolutely certain to vote]. Although subjects' stated likelihood of voting is not an outcome of interest (because the hypotheses and field experiments we describe in the manuscript concern actual turnout as the primary outcome, a behavior), in the interest of transparency we nonetheless present analyses of the comparative effectiveness of positively versus negatively framed descriptive norms on this outcome.

C.2 Results

C.2.1 Results of Manipulation Check for Study 1 (group referent)

Table A12: Effect of Positively Framed (vs. Negatively Framed) Descriptive Norm Treatment on the Perceived Level of Eligible Texan Voters who Voted in the 2016 General Election

	DV: Perceived Turnout Level (0-5, 5=highest)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment (1=Yes, 0=No, Negatively Framed)	1.745***	1.682***	1.756***	1.697***
	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.089)
Costs of Voting Prime (1=Yes, 0=No)			0.008	−0.032
			(0.084)	(0.088)
Asked Norm Perception Question First (1=Yes, 0=No)			−0.146*	−0.184**
			(0.084)	(0.089)
Constant	1.734***	0.608	1.798***	0.624
	(0.062)	(0.653)	(0.084)	(0.652)
Mean Outcome, Negatively Framed Treatment Group	1.734	1.734	1.734	1.734
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	610	610	610	610
Adjusted R^2	0.412	0.439	0.413	0.441
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2.2 Results of Manipulation Check for Study 2 (self referent)

Table A13: Effect of Positively Framed (vs. Negatively Framed) Descriptive Norm Treatment on the Perceived Level of One's Past Voting Behavior

	DV: Perceived Turnout Level (0-4, 4=highest)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment (1=Yes, 0=No, Negatively Framed)	0.096	0.099	0.099	0.097
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.071)
Vote History: 2012 N; 2014 Y; 2015 N; 2016 Y			0.097	0.150
			(0.116)	(0.122)
Vote History: 2012 N; 2014 Y; 2015 Y; 2016 N			0.118	0.130
			(0.118)	(0.127)
Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 N; 2015 N; 2016 Y			0.170	0.132
			(0.119)	(0.127)
Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 N; 2015 Y; 2016 N			0.050	0.060
			(0.117)	(0.123)
Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 Y; 2015 N; 2016 N			0.030	0.128
			(0.116)	(0.124)
Election Emphasized: 2014			0.104	0.069
			(0.091)	(0.097)
Election Emphasized: 2015			0.121	0.053
			(0.092)	(0.097)
Election Emphasized: 2016			0.125	0.087
			(0.097)	(0.105)
Constant	2.111***	1.091**	1.947***	0.895
	(0.046)	(0.520)	(0.107)	(0.543)
Mean Outcome, Negatively Framed Treatment Group	2.111	2.111	2.111	2.111
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	596	596	596	596
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.031	−0.003	0.022
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3 Additional Analyses

Table A14: Effect of Positively Framed (vs. Negatively Framed) Descriptive Norm Treatment on Subjects' Stated Likelihood of Voting in the Next Election (Study 1 with Group Referent and Study 2 with Self Referent)

	DV: Stated Likelihood of Voting in 2018 General Election (0-5, 5=Absolutely certain)							
	Group Referent				Self Referent			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment	0.214*	0.313***	0.212*	0.315***	−0.135	−0.073	−0.121	−0.063
	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Constant	3.514***	1.685**	3.592***	1.698**	3.108***	2.266***	3.040***	2.395***
	(0.085)	(0.799)	(0.116)	(0.800)	(0.076)	(0.793)	(0.177)	(0.828)
Mean Outcome, Negatively Framed Treatment Group	3.514	3.514	3.514	3.514	3.108	3.108	3.108	3.108
With Demographic Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
With Other Study 1 Treatment Variables?	N	N	Y	Y	–	–	–	–
With Other Study 2 Treatment Variables?	–	–	–	–	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	610	610	610	610	596	596	596	596
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.247	0.004	0.245	0.001	0.170	−0.0001	0.161
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A15: Effect of Priming the Costs of Voting in the Stated Vote Intention Item on Subjects' Stated Likelihood of Voting in the Next Election (Study 1 with Group Referent Only)

	DV: Stated Likelihood of Voting (0-5, 5=Absolutely certain)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Costs of Voting Prime (1=Yes, 0=No)	−0.167	−0.064	−0.064	−0.050
	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.170)	(0.162)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment			0.305*	0.324**
			(0.163)	(0.154)
Costs of Voting Prime * Positively Framed Norm Treatment			−0.187	−0.022
			(0.232)	(0.221)
Constant	3.712***	1.828**	3.546***	1.698**
	(0.081)	(0.803)	(0.120)	(0.800)
Mean Outcome, Control Group	3.712	3.712	3.712	3.712
With Demographic Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	610	610	610	610
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.236	0.005	0.245
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A16: Does the Effect on Perceptions of One's Past Vote History of Positively or Negatively Framed Descriptive Norms Vary by Vote History or by the Election Emphasized? (Study 2 with Self Referent Only)

	DV: Perceived Turnout Level (0-4, 4=highest)	
	(1)	(2)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment (1=Yes, 0=No, Negatively Framed)	0.078	0.024
	(0.244)	(0.260)
Vote History: 2012 N; 2014 Y; 2015 N; 2016 Y	0.072	0.107
	(0.177)	(0.193)
Vote History: 2012 N; 2014 Y; 2015 Y; 2016 N	0.156	0.094
	(0.191)	(0.204)
Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 N; 2015 N; 2016 Y	0.293*	0.299
	(0.176)	(0.186)
Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 N; 2015 Y; 2016 N	−0.009	0.037
	(0.175)	(0.181)
Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 Y; 2015 N; 2016 N	−0.049	−0.020
	(0.196)	(0.208)
Election Emphasized: 2014	0.084	−0.044
	(0.163)	(0.176)
Election Emphasized: 2015	0.095	0.011
	(0.156)	(0.166)
Election Emphasized: 2016	0.177	0.117
	(0.167)	(0.176)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Election Emphasized 2014	0.006	0.119
	(0.229)	(0.243)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Election Emphasized 2015	0.070	0.059
	(0.226)	(0.242)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Election Emphasized 2016	−0.041	0.028
	(0.240)	(0.251)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Vote History: 2012 N; 2014 Y; 2015 N; 2016 Y	0.086	0.053
	(0.263)	(0.281)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Vote History: 2012 N; 2014 Y; 2015 Y; 2016 N	−0.086	0.029
	(0.266)	(0.282)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 N; 2015 N; 2016 Y	−0.237	−0.342
	(0.267)	(0.283)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 N; 2015 Y; 2016 N	0.105	0.064
	(0.261)	(0.274)
Positively Framed Norm Treatment * Vote History: 2012 Y; 2014 Y; 2015 N; 2016 N	0.170	0.266
	(0.285)	(0.299)
Constant	1.950***	0.993*
	(0.148)	(0.556)
With Covariates?	N	Y
Observations	596	596
Adjusted R^2	−0.010	0.017
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01