

Supplemental Appendix for:

Perceptions of Deservingness and the Politicization of Social Insurance: Evidence from Disability Insurance in the United States

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June 30, 2019

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A SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

A.1 CCES Team Module, Pre-Election Wave Survey Instrument

DI Benefit Receipt - Self (single choice)

Randomize order of response options.

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is a federal program paying benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

Have you ever received SSDI benefit payments?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

DI Benefit Receipt - Others (grid)

Randomize order of rows.

Of the following groups, do you know anyone who has received SSDI benefit payments? If so, could they have worked at the time they received benefits?

Rows:

- Anyone else in your household
- Any of your friends
- Anyone in your extended family
- Anyone in your community

Columns:

- No
- Yes, and they legitimately received benefits because they could not work at the time
- Yes, and they received benefits even though they probably could have worked at the time
- Yes, but I don't know if they could have worked at the time

DI Case Decision (single choice)

Randomly select one phrase from the variable [DIAGNOSIS] to insert into the question text. Randomly reverse the answer choices.

Scott is a 34 year old white male who previously attended two years of college but did not graduate. He had been consistently working and making a living since he was 16, but in the last year he [DIAGNOSIS] and stopped working. Following the diagnosis, with the help of a legal aid attorney, he applied for and was approved to receive monthly disability benefits from the SSDI program.

Do you agree or disagree with the government's decision to allow Scott to collect SSDI benefit payments?

- 1 Strongly disagree
- 2 Disagree
- 3 Neither disagree nor agree
- 4 Agree
- 5 Strongly agree

[DIAGNOSIS]

Condition 1: was injured on the job

Condition 2: suffered a stroke that led to him becoming intellectually disabled

Condition 3: was diagnosed with a mood disorder

Condition 4: was diagnosed with chronic heart failure

Condition 5: was diagnosed with severe arthritis of the spine

A.2 CCES Team Module, Post-Election Wave Survey Instrument

DI Recipient Composition (grid)

Randomize the order of rows.

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is a federal program paying benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

What proportion of SSDI benefit recipients do you think:

Rows:

- Have a physical impairment not caused by injury
- Have an injury
- Have a mental disorder
- Have an intellectual disability
- Are in fact able to work but do not want to work
- Are able and want to work but are unable to find suitable employment
- Are non-elderly (under age 65)
- Are women
- Have 1-2 children
- Have 3 or more children
- Are white
- Receive other forms of public assistance (e.g., food stamps, cash assistance)

Columns:

- 1: 0-20% (Few)
- 2: 20-40%
- 3: 40-60%
- 4: 60-80%
- 5: 80-100% (Most)
- 9: Don't know

DI Program Attitudes (grid)

Randomize the order of rows. Randomly select one statement from the variable [ARGUMENT] to insert into the question text.

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is a federal program paying benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social

Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

[ARGUMENT]

State whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following statements.

Rows:

- Individuals with non-severe medical impairments, such as mood disorders and chronic fatigue or pain, should not be considered eligible for SSDI benefits.
- It is a major problem that people capable of working are instead opting for the disability rolls when confronted with employment challenges.
- Individuals with less severe impairments and residual capacities to work should be encouraged to return to work at a new job compatible with their capacity to work.
- People should be allowed to exceed the monthly income threshold (which is currently \$1,130 per month) while still receiving SSDI benefits.
- SSDI, a government program, should be replaced with a policy where all employers are mandated to provide full-time employees with long-term disability insurance that is at least as generous as the SSDI program.
- The federal government is spending too much on SSDI benefit payments.

Columns:

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Agree
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree
- 5 Strongly disagree
- 9 Don't know

[ARGUMENT]

Condition 1 [control]: (blank)

Condition 2 [risk pooling]: Today, the SSDI program protects more than 9 out of 10 American workers and their families in the event of a life-changing disability or illness that prevents substantial work. While it may not be easy to think about, a young worker starting a career today has a one-in-three chance of either dying or needing to turn to Disability Insurance before reaching his or her full Social Security retirement age of 67. While benefits are modest, averaging just over \$1,000 per month, Social Security Disability Insurance plays a significant role in boosting economic security for beneficiaries, and for 8 out of 10 beneficiaries it is their main or only source of income.

Condition 3 [costly program]: SSDI was originally created as a modest safety net aimed at severely disabled workers. Over time, however, the number of benefit recipients and the cost of these payments have grown dramatically. Between 1989 and 2009, the share of adults receiving SSDI benefits doubled. During the same period, cash payments to SSDI recipients tripled to \$121 billion.

Condition 4 [costly program + lax eligibility]: SSDI was originally created as a modest safety net aimed at severely disabled workers. Over time, however, the number of benefit recipients and the cost of these payments have grown dramatically. Between 1989 and 2009, the share of adults receiving SSDI benefits doubled even though the share of the U.S. working-age population reporting a severe disability remained stable. One controversial reason for the increase in SSDI recipients is the liberalization of the program's screening criteria, which makes it easier to get benefits for certain conditions. In 2014, for example, 14.7 percent of disabled workers receiving SSDI had a mood disorder diagnosis (e.g., anxiety-related disorders) and 31.2 percent of disabled workers receiving SSDI were diagnosed with diseases affecting the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (e.g., arthritis or burns).

Condition 5 [risk pooling + low abuse]: Today, the SSDI program protects more than 9 out of 10 American workers and their families in the event of a life-changing disability or illness that prevents substantial work. While it may not be easy to think about, a young worker starting a career today has a one-in-three chance of either dying or needing to turn to Disability Insurance before reaching his or her full Social Security retirement age of 67. While benefits are modest, averaging just over \$1,000 per month, Social Security Disability Insurance plays a significant role in boosting economic security for beneficiaries, and for 8 out of 10 beneficiaries it is their main or only source of income. The SSDI program has strict eligibility standards. In addition to having to earn disability insurance coverage by working at least 5 of the 10 years before the disability began, applicants must prove medical eligibility using evidence provided by licensed physicians, specialists, or other approved medical providers. As a result, most claims for SSDI benefits (more than 60%) are denied.

A.3 Lucid Survey Instrument

ss1 The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is a federal program paying benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

For each of the following groups, do you know anyone who has ever received SSDI benefit payments?

[GRID]

Columns: Yes; No

Rows:

- Parent or guardian
- Immediate family member (e.g., sibling, spouse, domestic partner, or child)
- Family relative (e.g., grandchild, aunt, cousin, or father-in-law)
- Close friend
- Someone from work
- Acquaintance (someone you see in person at least occasionally)
- Online acquaintance (someone you only interact with online)
- Person in your community (someone you do not interact with but know of)

Before you proceed, please take a second to think about the person in each group who you know has received SSDI benefits, if any.

If you know more than one person in one of the aforementioned groups who has received SSDI benefits, just think about the first person that comes to mind.

[PAGE BREAK]

SHOW ss2 AND ss3 ONLY IF THERE IS AT LEAST 1 'YES' RESPONSE TO ss1; ELSE SKIP TO ss4

ss2 In your opinion, did this person deserve SSDI benefits?

[GRID]

Columns: Yes; No

Rows: *Carry forward groups where YES is selected for Question ss1*

ss3 Which of the following best describes your perception of whether they could have worked at the time they collected SSDI benefits?

[GRID]

Columns: They could have worked; They could not have worked; I am uncertain whether they could have worked

Rows: *Carry forward groups where YES is selected for Question ss1*

[PAGE BREAK]

ss4 *As a reminder, the description of the SSDI program is repeated here:*

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is a federal program paying benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

We would like to know your beliefs about the average SSDI benefit recipient in the United States today.

ss5 In your opinion, does the average SSDI benefit recipient deserve to collect benefits?

- Yes
- No

ss6 In your opinion, do you think the average SSDI benefit recipient could in fact work?

- Yes, the average SSDI recipient could in fact work
- Not, the average SSDI recipient is unable to work
- I don't know

[PAGE BREAK]

ss7 *As a reminder, the description of the SSDI program is repeated here:*

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is a federal program paying benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

ss8 In your opinion, out of every 100 people receiving SSDI, how many do you think could have worked? Please provide your best guess.

[SLIDER: 0-100]

B SUMMARY STATISTICS

B.1 CCES Sample

Table A1: Demographic Characteristics by Sample. The table reports proportions or means with standard errors in parentheses for the pre-election sample, the post-election sample, and the 2016 CCES Common Content File.

Covariate	Pre-Election Survey <i>n</i> =1,145		Post-Election Survey <i>n</i> =1,231		2016 CCES <i>n</i> =64,600	
	Mean	(SE)	Mean	(SE)	Mean	(SE)
Age	48.005	(0.504)	50.611	(0.462)	47.880	(0.066)
Gender:						
Female	0.534	(0.015)	0.572	(0.014)	0.543	(0.002)
Male	0.466	(0.015)	0.428	(0.014)	0.457	(0.002)
Party ID:						
Democrat	0.379	(0.014)	0.358	(0.014)	0.385	(0.002)
Independent	0.362	(0.014)	0.379	(0.014)	0.378	(0.002)
Republican	0.259	(0.013)	0.262	(0.013)	0.237	(0.002)
Ideology:						
Very Liberal	0.086	(0.008)	0.089	(0.008)	0.090	(0.001)
Liberal	0.190	(0.012)	0.181	(0.011)	0.194	(0.002)
Moderate/DK	0.390	(0.014)	0.387	(0.014)	0.415	(0.002)
Conservative	0.231	(0.012)	0.228	(0.012)	0.222	(0.002)
Very Conservative	0.103	(0.009)	0.114	(0.009)	0.078	(0.001)
Registered Voter?:						
Yes	0.904	(0.009)	0.924	(0.008)	0.883	(0.001)
No	0.085	(0.008)	0.070	(0.007)	0.103	(0.001)
Don't know	0.011	(0.003)	0.006	(0.002)	0.013	(0.000)
Highest Education Attained:						
No HS	0.024	(0.004)	0.018	(0.004)	0.031	(0.001)
High school graduate	0.266	(0.013)	0.252	(0.012)	0.254	(0.002)
Some college	0.239	(0.013)	0.253	(0.012)	0.243	(0.002)
2-year	0.113	(0.009)	0.113	(0.009)	0.111	(0.001)
4-year	0.227	(0.012)	0.223	(0.012)	0.230	(0.002)
Post-grad	0.132	(0.010)	0.141	(0.010)	0.132	(0.001)
Race:						
Asian	0.045	(0.006)	0.041	(0.006)	0.035	(0.001)
Black	0.123	(0.010)	0.097	(0.008)	0.123	(0.001)
Hispanic	0.067	(0.007)	0.068	(0.007)	0.081	(0.001)
Middle Eastern	0.002	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.002	(0.000)
Mixed	0.018	(0.004)	0.020	(0.004)	0.022	(0.001)
Native American	0.009	(0.003)	0.011	(0.003)	0.008	(0.000)
Other	0.016	(0.004)	0.016	(0.004)	0.012	(0.000)
White	0.720	(0.013)	0.745	(0.012)	0.717	(0.002)
Hispanic origin:						
No	0.898	(0.009)	0.904	(0.008)	0.881	(0.001)
Unknown if Hispanic	0.070	(0.008)	0.071	(0.007)	0.084	(0.001)
Yes	0.032	(0.005)	0.025	(0.004)	0.035	(0.001)
Marital status:						
Divorced	0.114	(0.009)	0.119	(0.009)	0.104	(0.001)
Domestic partnership	0.033	(0.005)	0.035	(0.005)	0.044	(0.001)
Married	0.548	(0.015)	0.562	(0.014)	0.534	(0.002)
Separated	0.015	(0.004)	0.015	(0.003)	0.016	(0.000)
Single	0.248	(0.013)	0.219	(0.012)	0.256	(0.002)
Unknown marital status	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.000)
Widowed	0.041	(0.006)	0.050	(0.006)	0.045	(0.001)
Employment status:						
Full-time	0.445	(0.015)	0.433	(0.014)	0.432	(0.002)
Homemaker	0.072	(0.008)	0.073	(0.007)	0.075	(0.001)
Other	0.026	(0.005)	0.024	(0.004)	0.018	(0.001)
Part-time	0.121	(0.010)	0.110	(0.009)	0.108	(0.001)
Permanently disabled	0.053	(0.007)	0.062	(0.007)	0.060	(0.001)
Retired	0.191	(0.012)	0.223	(0.012)	0.199	(0.002)

(continued)

Table A1 (continued): Demographic Characteristics by Sample

Covariate	Pre-Election Survey <i>n</i> =1,145		Post-Election Survey <i>n</i> =1,231		2016 CCES <i>n</i> =64,600	
	Mean	(SE)	Mean	(SE)	Mean	(SE)
Student	0.038	(0.006)	0.027	(0.005)	0.046	(0.001)
Temporarily laid off	0.005	(0.002)	0.004	(0.002)	0.007	(0.000)
Unemployed	0.049	(0.006)	0.044	(0.006)	0.055	(0.001)
Homeownership status:						
Own	0.640	(0.014)	0.658	(0.014)	0.630	(0.002)
Rent	0.320	(0.014)	0.301	(0.013)	0.323	(0.002)
Other	0.038	(0.006)	0.038	(0.005)	0.046	(0.001)
Unknown	0.003	(0.002)	0.002	(0.001)	0.001	(0.000)
Union member:						
Yes, currently	0.081	(0.008)	0.071	(0.007)	0.074	(0.001)
Formerly	0.195	(0.012)	0.209	(0.012)	0.178	(0.002)
Never	0.722	(0.013)	0.719	(0.013)	0.746	(0.002)
Unknown union status	0.002	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.002	(0.000)
Union household (Anyone in household a union member):						
Yes, currently	0.091	(0.008)	0.088	(0.008)	0.092	(0.001)
Formerly	0.139	(0.010)	0.139	(0.010)	0.131	(0.001)
Never	0.768	(0.012)	0.772	(0.012)	0.771	(0.002)
Unknown union household status	0.003	(0.002)	0.002	(0.001)	0.006	(0.000)
Family income:						
\$10,000 - \$19,999	0.073	(0.008)	0.064	(0.007)	0.070	(0.001)
\$100,000 - \$119,999	0.051	(0.006)	0.054	(0.006)	0.063	(0.001)
\$120,000 - \$149,999	0.051	(0.006)	0.050	(0.006)	0.055	(0.001)
\$150,000 - \$199,999	0.031	(0.005)	0.032	(0.005)	0.029	(0.001)
\$150,000 or more	0.002	(0.001)	0.002	(0.001)	0.003	(0.000)
\$20,000 - \$29,999	0.097	(0.009)	0.102	(0.009)	0.100	(0.001)
\$200,000 - \$249,999	0.013	(0.003)	0.011	(0.003)	0.013	(0.000)
\$250,000 - \$349,999	0.008	(0.003)	0.009	(0.003)	0.007	(0.000)
\$30,000 - \$39,999	0.101	(0.009)	0.102	(0.009)	0.102	(0.001)
\$350,000 - \$499,999	0.003	(0.002)	0.002	(0.001)	0.003	(0.000)
\$40,000 - \$49,999	0.081	(0.008)	0.084	(0.008)	0.089	(0.001)
\$50,000 - \$59,999	0.089	(0.008)	0.091	(0.008)	0.089	(0.001)
\$500,000 or more	0.002	(0.001)			0.003	(0.000)
\$60,000 - \$69,999	0.083	(0.008)	0.082	(0.008)	0.070	(0.001)
\$70,000 - \$79,999	0.084	(0.008)	0.080	(0.008)	0.073	(0.001)
\$80,000 - \$99,999	0.079	(0.008)	0.077	(0.008)	0.088	(0.001)
Less than \$10,000	0.043	(0.006)	0.041	(0.006)	0.044	(0.001)
Prefer not to say	0.109	(0.009)	0.115	(0.009)	0.101	(0.001)
Immigration status:						
First generation	0.099	(0.009)	0.098	(0.008)	0.095	(0.001)
Immigrant Citizen	0.066	(0.007)	0.059	(0.007)	0.066	(0.001)
Immigrant non-citizen	0.020	(0.004)	0.014	(0.003)	0.021	(0.001)
Second generation	0.188	(0.012)	0.206	(0.012)	0.195	(0.002)
Third generation	0.618	(0.014)	0.617	(0.014)	0.621	(0.002)
Unknown immigrant status	0.009	(0.003)	0.005	(0.002)	0.002	(0.000)

B.2 Lucid Sample

Table A2: Demographic Characteristics of the Lucid Sample (n=3,034). The table reports unweighted and weighted frequencies and proportions. The weighted estimates use raking weights, which are calculated using the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates to match population marginals by age, education, and household income.

Variable	Unweighted N	Unweighted Prop.	Weighted N	Weighted Prop.
Age: 18-24	325	(0.11)	595.03	(0.20)
Age: 25-29	303	(0.10)	603.4	(0.20)
Age: 30-49	1119	(0.37)	633.38	(0.21)
Age: 50-69	984	(0.32)	629.82	(0.21)
Age: 70+	303	(0.10)	572.37	(0.19)
Party ID: Strong Democrat	660	(0.22)	631.14	(0.21)
Party ID: Democrat	421	(0.14)	394.94	(0.13)
Party ID: Lean Democrat	289	(0.10)	289.36	(0.10)
Party ID: Independent	599	(0.20)	570.65	(0.19)
Party ID: Lean Republican	239	(0.08)	304.07	(0.10)
Party ID: Republican	331	(0.11)	330.39	(0.11)
Party ID: Strong Republican	495	(0.16)	513.44	(0.17)
Ideology: Very Liberal	321	(0.11)	314.18	(0.10)
Ideology: Liberal	540	(0.18)	556.52	(0.18)
Ideology: Moderate	1287	(0.43)	1264.54	(0.42)
Ideology: Conservative	575	(0.19)	593.99	(0.20)
Ideology: Very Conservative	304	(0.10)	294.37	(0.10)
Race: Black	397	(0.13)	354.2	(0.12)
Race: Other	504	(0.17)	531.38	(0.18)
Hispanic	336	(0.11)	417.46	(0.14)
Female	1577	(0.52)	1572.82	(0.52)
Household Income Scale: 1 (Lowest)	569	(0.19)	337.18	(0.11)
Household Income Scale: 2	229	(0.08)	141.09	(0.05)
Household Income Scale: 3	237	(0.08)	149.8	(0.05)
Household Income Scale: 4	164	(0.05)	132.91	(0.04)
Household Income Scale: 5	201	(0.07)	141.94	(0.05)
Household Income Scale: 6	158	(0.05)	113.26	(0.04)
Household Income Scale: 7	106	(0.03)	127.23	(0.04)
Household Income Scale: 8	124	(0.04)	106.33	(0.04)
Household Income Scale: 9	163	(0.05)	107.75	(0.04)
Household Income Scale: 10	84	(0.03)	95.99	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 11	97	(0.03)	98.22	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 12	75	(0.02)	86.88	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 13	93	(0.03)	92.49	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 14	79	(0.03)	82.58	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 15	41	(0.01)	81.6	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 16	37	(0.01)	67.26	(0.02)
Household Income Scale: 17	22	(0.01)	68	(0.02)
Household Income Scale: 18	51	(0.02)	59.02	(0.02)
Household Income Scale: 19	133	(0.04)	204.42	(0.07)
Household Income Scale: 20	63	(0.02)	147.59	(0.05)
Household Income Scale: 21	29	(0.01)	89.74	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 22	33	(0.01)	42.41	(0.01)
Household Income Scale: 23	27	(0.01)	77.99	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 24	35	(0.01)	98	(0.03)
Household Income Scale: 25	184	(0.06)	284.34	(0.09)
Highest Education Attained: HS or less	189	(0.06)	362.4	(0.12)
Highest Education Attained: 2	869	(0.29)	884.38	(0.29)
Highest Education Attained: 4	728	(0.24)	643.3	(0.21)

(continued)


Table A2: Demographic Characteristics of the Lucid Sample (continued)

Variable	Unweighted N	Unweighted Prop.	Weighted N	Weighted Prop.
Highest Education Attained: 5	322	(0.11)	274.98	(0.09)
Highest Education Attained: 6	610	(0.20)	570.73	(0.19)
Highest Education Attained: 7	256	(0.08)	254.46	(0.08)
Highest Education Attained: PhD+	60	(0.02)	43.75	(0.01)
Region: Northeast	563	(0.19)	646.27	(0.21)
Region: South	1164	(0.38)	1128.74	(0.37)
Region: West	675	(0.22)	677.27	(0.22)
Political Knowledge Scale: 0 (Lowest)	258	(0.09)	231.7	(0.08)
Political Knowledge Scale: 1	531	(0.18)	537.76	(0.18)
Political Knowledge Scale: 2	589	(0.19)	593.58	(0.20)
Political Knowledge Scale: 3	445	(0.15)	428	(0.14)
Political Knowledge Scale: 4	417	(0.14)	427.5	(0.14)
Political Knowledge Scale: 5	340	(0.11)	353.54	(0.12)
Political Knowledge Scale: 6 (Highest)	454	(0.15)	461.92	(0.15)
Political Interest: Not at all	303	(0.10)	288.94	(0.10)
Political Interest: Slightly	360	(0.12)	357.19	(0.12)
Political Interest: Somewhat	900	(0.30)	885.43	(0.29)
Political Interest: Very	781	(0.26)	788.29	(0.26)
Political Interest: Extremely	689	(0.23)	713.9	(0.24)
Registered to Vote	2326	(0.77)	2302.36	(0.76)
Voted in 2016 General Election	1944	(0.64)	1904.61	(0.63)
2016 Pres. Vote Choice: Voted for Clinton	861	(0.28)	813.64	(0.27)
2016 Pres. Vote Choice: Did Not Vote for Clinton or Trump	1349	(0.44)	1375.74	(0.45)
2016 Pres. Vote Choice: Voted for Trump	824	(0.27)	844.63	(0.28)
Mobile Device User: Yes	1660	(0.55)	1609.99	(0.53)

C ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS


C.1 CCES Data

Figure A1: Perceptions of the Percentage of SSDI Recipients Who Are Able and Want to Work But Are Unable to Find Suitable Employment



Source: 2016 CCES team module, post-election wave.

Figure A2: Perceptions of the Percentage of SSDI Recipients with Other Given Characteristics



A-14

Source: 2016 CCES team module, post-election wave.

Table A3: Party Identification and Perceptions of the Share of SSDI Recipients Who Can But Do Not Want To Work

	DV: Perceives at least <i>k</i> % of SSDI recipients can but do not want to work (1=Yes, 0=No)											
	k=40 (1)	k=40 (2)	k=40 (3)	k=40 (4)	k=60 (5)	k=60 (6)	k=60 (7)	k=60 (8)	k=80 (9)	k=80 (10)	k=80 (11)	k=80 (12)
Independent	0.095*** (0.035)	0.062* (0.035)	0.103*** (0.037)	0.080** (0.038)	0.068** (0.030)	0.056* (0.031)	0.066** (0.032)	0.045 (0.033)	0.027 (0.020)	0.006 (0.021)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.022)
Republican	0.213*** (0.038)	0.185*** (0.038)	0.199*** (0.042)	0.185*** (0.041)	0.164*** (0.033)	0.163*** (0.033)	0.150*** (0.036)	0.153*** (0.036)	0.065*** (0.022)	0.035 (0.022)	0.056** (0.024)	0.034 (0.024)
Constant	0.302*** (0.025)	0.330*** (0.025)	0.370 (0.273)	0.550** (0.224)	0.153*** (0.021)	0.171*** (0.022)	0.126 (0.234)	0.226 (0.196)	0.056*** (0.014)	0.076*** (0.015)	0.283* (0.157)	0.221* (0.133)
With Covariates?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Weighted?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Adjusted R ²	0.027	0.021	0.034	0.100	0.022	0.021	0.017	0.080	0.007	0.001	-0.002	0.047

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cells report estimates from OLS models regressing a binary indicator that the respondent perceives at least *k*% of SSDI recipients can but do not want to work on predictors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sample restricted to respondents in 2016 CCES team module post-election wave survey who did not select "Don't Know" to the question about their perceptions of the percentage of SSDI recipients who are able to work but do not want to work. The omitted reference category is Democrats. Control variables included in the model specification are age, voter registration status, gender, highest education level attained, race, Hispanic, marital status, employment status, homeownership status, union member, union household, family income level, and immigration status.

C.2 Lucid Data

Table A4: Reported Knowledge of Other SSDI Benefit Recipients and Beliefs about their Deservingness, by Social Reference Group

Knowledge of SSDI Recipient in Group and Belief about their Deservingness	Parent		Imm. Family		Ext. Family		Friend		Coworker		Acquaintance		Online Acq.		In Community	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
A. Unweighted																
(1) No	2051	67.60	2006	66.12	1928	63.55	1966	64.80	2347	77.36	1911	62.99	2489	82.04	1882	62.03
(2) Yes and deserving	859	28.31	908	29.93	886	29.20	838	27.62	471	15.52	790	26.04	393	12.95	837	27.59
(3) Yes and undeserving	105	3.46	109	3.59	207	6.82	209	6.89	196	6.46	319	10.51	138	4.55	299	9.85
(4) Don't Know/Refused	19	0.63	11	0.36	13	0.43	21	0.69	20	0.66	14	0.46	14	0.46	16	0.53
Ratio: Deserving to Undeserving (Row 2 to Row 3)	8.18		8.33		4.28		4.01		2.40		2.48		2.85		2.80	
Alt. Ratio: Row 2 to Sum of Rows 3-4	6.93		7.57		4.03		3.64		2.18		2.37		2.59		2.66	
B. Weighted																
(1) No	2101.35	69.26	2158.99	71.16	1959.27	64.58	2110.63	69.57	2336.16	77.00	2020.70	66.60	2494.46	82.22	1950.35	64.28
(2) Yes and deserving	803.59	26.49	751.90	24.78	793.13	26.14	698.53	23.02	469.37	15.47	705.07	23.24	341.34	11.25	742.93	24.49
(3) Yes and undeserving	113.34	3.74	110.33	3.64	266.20	8.77	207.38	6.84	208.93	6.89	290.92	9.59	190.63	6.28	331.37	10.92
(4) Don't Know/Refused	15.72	0.52	12.77	0.42	15.40	0.51	17.46	0.58	19.54	0.64	17.31	0.57	7.58	0.25	9.34	0.31
Ratio: Deserving to Undeserving (Row 2 to Row 3)	7.09		6.82		2.98		3.37		2.25		2.42		1.79		2.24	
Alt. Ratio: Row 2 to Sum of Rows 3-4	6.23		6.11		2.82		3.11		2.05		2.29		1.72		2.18	

Table A5: Reported Knowledge of Other SSDI Benefit Recipients and Beliefs about their Ability to Work, by Social Reference Group

Knowledge of SSDI Recipient in Group and Belief about their Ability to Work	Parent		Imm. Family		Ext. Family		Friend		Coworker		Acquaintance		Online Acq.		In Community	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
A. Unweighted																
(1) No	2051	67.60	2006	66.12	1928	63.55	1966	64.80	2347	77.36	1911	62.99	2489	82.04	1882	62.03
(2) Yes and could not have worked	578	19.05	653	21.52	667	21.98	620	20.44	305	10.05	483	15.92	230	7.58	481	15.85
(3) Yes and could have worked	218	7.19	217	7.15	258	8.50	253	8.34	228	7.51	335	11.04	142	4.68	312	10.28
(4) Yes and DK if could work	166	5.47	146	4.81	167	5.50	174	5.74	135	4.45	295	9.72	157	5.17	345	11.37
(5) Don't Know/Refused	21	0.69	12	0.40	14	0.46	21	0.69	19	0.63	10	0.33	16	0.53	14	0.46
Ratio: Could Not Work to Could Work (Row 2 to Row 3)	2.65		3.01		2.59		2.45		1.34		1.44		1.62		1.54	
Alt. Ratio: Row 2 to Sum of Rows 3-4	1.51		1.80		1.57		1.45		0.84		0.77		0.77		0.73	
Alt. Ratio: Row 2 to Sum of Rows 3-5	1.43		1.74		1.52		1.38		0.80		0.75		0.73		0.72	
B. Weighted																
(1) No	2101.35	69.26	2158.99	71.16	1959.27	64.58	2110.63	69.57	2336.16	77.00	2020.70	66.60	2494.46	82.22	1950.35	64.28
(2) Yes and could not have worked	498.27	16.42	522.51	17.22	615.10	20.27	517.20	17.05	295.63	9.74	422.05	13.91	209.79	6.91	403.52	13.30
(3) Yes and could have worked	260.55	8.59	206.49	6.81	273.61	9.02	244.66	8.06	260.48	8.59	343.44	11.32	147.71	4.87	329.73	10.87
(4) Yes and DK if could work	155.36	5.12	133.07	4.39	170.77	5.63	149.79	4.94	122.44	4.04	242.21	7.98	166.61	5.49	341.86	11.27
(5) Don't Know/Refused	18.46	0.61	12.93	0.43	15.25	0.50	11.72	0.39	19.29	0.64	5.59	0.18	15.43	0.51	8.54	0.28
Ratio: Could Not Work to Could Work (Row 2 to Row 3)	1.91		2.53		2.25		2.11		1.13		1.23		1.42		1.22	
Alt. Ratio: Row 2 to Sum of Rows 3-4	1.20		1.54		1.38		1.31		0.77		0.72		0.67		0.60	
Alt. Ratio: Row 2 to Sum of Rows 3-5	1.15		1.48		1.34		1.27		0.74		0.71		0.64		0.59	

Table A6: Beliefs about the Average SSDI Recipient (Lucid sample)

Quantity	Unweighted		Weighted		N
	Estimate	95% CI	Estimate	95% CI	
Proportion of respondents who believe the average SSDI recipient deserves benefits	0.78	[0.76, 0.79]	0.76	[0.75, 0.78]	3027
Mean respondent belief about whether the average SSDI recipient could work	0.46	[0.44, 0.47]	0.49	[0.47, 0.50]	3028
Mean estimate: Number out of 100 people receiving SSDI who could have worked	42.89	[41.99, 43.80]	44.11	[43.22, 44.99]	3018

Table A7: Party Identification and Beliefs about the Average SSDI Recipient

	Dependent variable:											
	Deserve				Could Work				Num. Could Work			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Independent	-0.130*** (0.020)	-0.072*** (0.023)	-0.171*** (0.021)	-0.098*** (0.024)	0.058*** (0.021)	0.024 (0.024)	0.097*** (0.021)	0.060** (0.024)	4.961*** (1.237)	2.290* (1.378)	7.147*** (1.212)	3.074** (1.350)
Republican	-0.136*** (0.017)	-0.053** (0.024)	-0.125*** (0.017)	-0.019 (0.024)	0.144*** (0.017)	0.080*** (0.024)	0.165*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.024)	9.260*** (1.028)	4.560*** (1.396)	8.424*** (0.994)	2.673** (1.328)
Constant	0.849*** (0.011)	0.547*** (0.119)	0.844*** (0.012)	0.504*** (0.116)	0.395*** (0.011)	0.385*** (0.120)	0.405*** (0.012)	0.315*** (0.115)	38.659*** (0.680)	45.368*** (7.011)	39.537*** (0.680)	50.661*** (6.503)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Weighted?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	3,027	3,027	3,027	3,027	3,028	3,028	3,028	3,028	3,018	3,018	3,018	3,018
Adjusted R ²	0.025	0.036	0.028	0.083	0.022	0.046	0.030	0.091	0.026	0.109	0.025	0.155

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Outcome variables: Deserve (Believes the average SSDI recipient deserves benefits: 1=Yes, 0=No); Could Work (Believes the average SSDI recipient could work: 0=No, 0.5=DK, 1=Yes); Num. Could Work (Estimate of number of people, out of 100 SSDI recipients, who could work).

Covariates include political interest, ideology, state, mobile respondent, total survey duration, passed screener, education, race (Black, other), Hispanic, female, household income, region dummies, level of political knowledge, voter registration status, whether the respondent voted in 2016, vote choice in the 2016 presidential election, and age.

C.3 Analysis of Descriptive Differences between Partisan Subgroups in the Perceived Pervasiveness of Cheating

To formally test whether there are descriptive differences in the pervasiveness of cheating between partisan subgroups, we construct binary indicators for whether the respondent perceives at least 40, 60, or 80% of SSDI recipients as not wanting to work despite being able to, and then we regress these indicators on the respondent's partisanship. Full results and model specification details are shown in Appendix Table A3. Among those reporting a perception, about 30% of Democrats perceive that at least 40% of SSDI recipients can but do not want to work, as compared to about 40% of Independents (difference=0.095, s.e.=0.035, $p<0.01$) and 52% of Republicans (difference=0.213, s.e.=0.038, $p<0.01$). Republicans are about 1.7 times more likely than Democrats to hold this perception. These associations are robust to weighting and the inclusion of demographic controls, and thus provide strong evidence of a partisan gap in perceptions of the degree of cheating among SSDI recipients. We observe similar and statistically significant partisan gaps between Democrats and Republicans in the belief that bigger shares of SSDI recipients are illegitimately receiving benefits. (As compared to Democrats, Republicans are about twice as likely to believe that 60% of SSDI recipients can but do not want to work (31.7% vs. 15.3%; difference=0.164, s.e.=0.033, $p<0.01$) and twice as likely to believe that at least 80% of SSDI recipients can but do not want to work

(12.1% vs. 5.6%; difference=0.065, s.e.=0.022, $p<0.01$.)

These observational associations also replicate in the large Lucid sample, where we asked respondents whether the average SSDI benefit recipient deserves to collect benefits (1=Yes, 0=No); whether the average benefit recipient could in fact work (1=Yes; 0.5=Don't know; 0=No); and their guess of how many SSDI beneficiaries (out of every 100) could have worked. We regress each of these measures on respondent partisanship and find similar patterns: Republicans are less likely than Democrats to believe that the average SSDI recipient deserves benefits (difference=-0.053, s.e.=0.024, $p<0.05$), more likely than Democrats to believe that the average SSDI recipient could work (difference=0.079, s.e.=0.024, $p<0.01$), and believes that a higher share of SSDI recipients could in fact work (difference=4.544, s.e.=1.396, $p<0.01$). These results are robust to weighting and the inclusion of demographic controls. See Appendix Table A7 for full estimation results.

D ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR EXPERIMENT 1

Table A8: Mean agreement with government decision to grant SSDI benefits to recipient, by the medical impairment of the SSDI benefit recipient and by the subject's (perceiver's) party identification.

	All Subjects	By Subject's Party ID			Diff (D-R)
		Dems	Inds	Reps	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Injured on the job	0.686*** (0.069)	0.785*** (0.110)	0.812*** (0.115)	0.375*** (0.132)	0.410 [p=0.024]
Intellectual disability due to stroke	1.032*** (0.073)	1.161*** (0.113)	1.057*** (0.127)	0.814*** (0.137)	0.347 [p=0.06]
Mood disorder	-0.031 (0.071)	0.346*** (0.118)	-0.059 (0.115)	-0.476*** (0.133)	0.822 [p<0.001]
Chronic heart failure	0.835*** (0.071)	1.052*** (0.107)	0.621*** (0.113)	0.787*** (0.154)	0.264 [p=0.15]
Severe arthritis of the spine	0.846*** (0.071)	0.882*** (0.121)	0.747*** (0.113)	0.937*** (0.132)	-0.056 [p=0.731]
Observations	1,145	434	414	297	
Adjusted R ²	0.335	0.415	0.313	0.301	

Source: 2016 CCES team module, pre-election wave

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome variable is the subject's agreement with the government's decision to grant SSDI benefits to a hypothetical recipient with a given medical impairment, and is measured using a 5-point scale (-2=Strongly Disagree, 2=Strongly Agree). The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing the agreement score on binary treatment indicators and no intercept. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; two-tailed *p*-values are shown in brackets.

Table A9: Effect of alternative easier-to-diagnose impairments (as compared to having a mood disorder, a harder-to-diagnose impairment) on agreement with government decision to grant SSDI benefits to recipient with a given impairment.

	Unadjusted (1)	Covariate adjusted (2)
Injured on the job	0.717*** (0.099)	0.723*** (0.099)
Intellectual disability due to stroke	1.063*** (0.102)	1.104*** (0.102)
Chronic heart failure	0.866*** (0.100)	0.870*** (0.100)
Severe arthritis of the spine	0.876*** (0.100)	0.874*** (0.101)
Constant	-0.031 (0.071)	0.147 (0.469)
With Covariates?	N	Y
Mean Outcome in Comparison Group (Mood Disorder):	-0.031	-0.031
Observations	1,145	1,145
Adjusted R ²	0.102	0.151

Source: 2016 CCES team module, pre-election wave

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome variable is the subject's agreement with the government's decision to grant SSDI benefits to a hypothetical recipient with a given medical impairment, and is measured using a 5-point scale (-2=Strongly Disagree, 2=Strongly Agree). The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing the agreement score on binary treatment indicators (omitting the mood disorder condition as the reference group). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Pre-treatment covariates included in the covariate adjusted model include age, gender, party identification, ideology, voter registration status, education, race, Hispanic origin, marital status, employment status, home ownership status, union member status, union member household status, family income level, and immigrant status.

Figure A3: Mean levels of agreement with government decision to grant SSDI benefits to recipient by the medical impairment of the SSDI benefit recipient, by the subject's ideology, with 95% confidence intervals. The ideological gap in mean agreement scores between liberals and conservatives is shown using solid black lines. Source: 2016 CCES team module, pre-election wave.




Table A10: Mean agreement with government decision to grant SSDI benefits to recipient, by the medical impairment of the SSDI benefit recipient and by the subject’s ideology.

	All Subjects	By Subject’s Ideology		
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Injured on the job	0.686*** (0.069)	0.968*** (0.131)	0.704*** (0.109)	0.444*** (0.116)
Intellectual disability due to stroke	1.032*** (0.073)	1.184*** (0.149)	0.989*** (0.114)	0.987*** (0.118)
Mood disorder	-0.031 (0.071)	0.444*** (0.131)	-0.022 (0.112)	-0.452*** (0.122)
Chronic heart failure	0.835*** (0.071)	1.087*** (0.116)	0.679*** (0.122)	0.726*** (0.122)
Severe arthritis of the spine	0.846*** (0.071)	1.016*** (0.133)	0.659*** (0.115)	0.923*** (0.118)
Observations	1,145	316	446	383
Adjusted R ²	0.335	0.461	0.282	0.332

Source: 2016 CCES team module, pre-election wave

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome variable is the subject’s agreement with the government’s decision to grant SSDI benefits to a hypothetical recipient with a given medical impairment, and is measured using a 5-point scale (-2=Strongly Disagree, 2=Strongly Agree). The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing the agreement score on binary treatment indicators and no intercept. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table A11: Heterogeneous effects, by subject partisanship, of alternative easier-to-diagnose impairments (as compared to having a mood disorder, a harder-to-diagnose impairment) on agreement with government decision to grant SSDI benefits to recipient with a given impairment.

	(1)	(2)
Injured on job	0.851*** (0.188)	
Stroke-induced intellectual disability	1.290*** (0.192)	
Chronic heart failure	1.263*** (0.204)	
Severe arthritis of the spine	1.414*** (0.188)	
Any easier-to-diagnose impairment		1.198*** (0.151)
Democrat	0.822*** (0.178)	0.822*** (0.179)
Independent	0.417** (0.176)	0.417** (0.177)
Injured on job * Democrat	-0.412* (0.247)	
Stroke * Democrat	-0.475* (0.252)	
Chronic heart failure * Democrat	-0.558** (0.259)	
Arthritis * Democrat	-0.878*** (0.253)	
Injured on job * Independent	0.019 (0.248)	
Stroke * Independent	-0.174 (0.257)	
Chronic heart failure * Independent	-0.584** (0.260)	
Arthritis * Independent	-0.608** (0.247)	
Any easier-to-diagnose impairment * Democrat		-0.572*** (0.200)
Any easier-to-diagnose impairment * Independent		-0.343* (0.199)
Constant	-0.476*** (0.133)	-0.476*** (0.134)
Observations	1,145	1,145
Adjusted R ²	0.127	0.115

Source: 2016 CCES team module, pre-election wave

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome variable is the subject's agreement with the government's decision to grant SSDI benefits to a hypothetical recipient with a given medical impairment, and is measured using a 5-point scale (-2=Strongly Disagree, 2=Strongly Agree). The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing the agreement score on binary treatment indicators (omitting the mood disorder condition as the reference group), party identification dummy variables (omitting Republicans as the reference group), and treatment by party interactions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

E ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Table A12: Effect of informational appeals about the SSDI program on SSDI program attitudes

	DV = Agreement with statement (5-pt scale, -2 strongly disagree to 2 strongly agree)							
	Federal gov spends too much on SSDI benefits		Problem if can work but is on SSDI		Non-severe should be ineligible		Encourage work if impairment is less severe	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Among All Subjects								
Risk Pooling	-0.266** (0.106)	-0.184* (0.098)	-0.243** (0.100)	-0.154 (0.095)	-0.200* (0.102)	-0.131 (0.100)	-0.218*** (0.076)	-0.180** (0.077)
Risk Pooling + Low Abuse Risk	-0.231** (0.110)	-0.230** (0.101)	-0.120 (0.104)	-0.081 (0.098)	-0.073 (0.106)	-0.078 (0.104)	-0.067 (0.079)	-0.041 (0.079)
Costly Program	0.059 (0.106)	0.101 (0.097)	0.017 (0.100)	0.063 (0.094)	0.064 (0.102)	0.082 (0.099)	-0.042 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.076)
Costly Program + Lax Eligibility	0.167 (0.106)	0.199** (0.096)	0.106 (0.100)	0.176* (0.094)	0.217** (0.102)	0.249** (0.099)	0.074 (0.077)	0.086 (0.076)
Constant	0.118 (0.077)	0.086 (0.532)	0.620*** (0.072)	0.537 (0.517)	-0.076 (0.074)	-0.073 (0.544)	0.945*** (0.055)	0.767* (0.417)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Control Group Mean Outcome	0.118	0.118	0.620	0.620	-0.076	-0.076	0.945	0.945
Observations	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231
Adjusted R ²	0.017	0.234	0.009	0.175	0.012	0.126	0.010	0.084
B. Robustness Check: Among Subjects Who Never Received SSDI Benefits (and who were in both pre- and post-election waves)								
Risk Pooling	-0.278** (0.129)	-0.175 (0.119)	-0.169 (0.123)	-0.065 (0.117)	-0.216* (0.126)	-0.094 (0.124)	-0.221** (0.092)	-0.181* (0.094)
Risk Pooling + Low Abuse Risk	-0.234* (0.135)	-0.264** (0.124)	-0.030 (0.128)	-0.023 (0.122)	-0.099 (0.131)	-0.085 (0.129)	-0.031 (0.096)	-0.044 (0.098)
Costly Program	0.012 (0.128)	0.027 (0.116)	0.159 (0.121)	0.152 (0.115)	0.029 (0.124)	0.090 (0.122)	0.048 (0.091)	0.066 (0.092)
Costly Program + Lax Eligibility	0.127 (0.129)	0.176 (0.117)	0.178 (0.122)	0.254** (0.116)	0.117 (0.125)	0.211* (0.122)	0.124 (0.091)	0.131 (0.092)
Constant	0.213** (0.092)	-0.131 (0.664)	0.594*** (0.088)	0.919 (0.658)	0.000 (0.090)	-0.380 (0.695)	0.975*** (0.066)	0.766 (0.526)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Control Group Mean Outcome	0.212	0.212	0.594	0.594	0.000	0.000	0.975	0.975
Observations	814	814	814	814	814	814	814	814
Adjusted R ²	0.013	0.253	0.009	0.179	0.005	0.126	0.015	0.077

Source: 2016 CCES team module

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing each outcome variable on binary treatment indicators, without and with covariates. The omitted reference category is the control group. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Pre-treatment covariates included in the covariate adjusted model include age, gender, party identification, ideology, voter registration status, education, race, Hispanic origin, marital status, employment status, home ownership status, union member status, union member household status, family income level, and immigrant status.

Table A13: Effect of any risk pooling appeal or any costly program appeal on SSDI program attitudes

	DV = Agreement with statement (5-pt scale, -2 strongly disagree to 2 strongly agree)							
	Federal gov spends too much on SSDI benefits		Problem if can work but is on SSDI		Non-severe should be ineligible		Encourage work if impairment is less severe	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Any Risk Pooling Treatment	-0.250*** (0.094)	-0.205** (0.086)	-0.186** (0.088)	-0.120 (0.084)	-0.141 (0.090)	-0.106 (0.089)	-0.148** (0.068)	-0.115* (0.068)
Any Costly Program Treatment	0.113 (0.093)	0.150* (0.084)	0.061 (0.087)	0.120 (0.082)	0.140 (0.089)	0.166* (0.086)	0.016 (0.067)	0.036 (0.066)
Constant	0.118 (0.077)	0.109 (0.530)	0.620*** (0.072)	0.524 (0.516)	-0.076 (0.074)	-0.073 (0.543)	0.945*** (0.055)	0.733* (0.416)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Control Group Mean Outcome	0.118	0.118	0.620	0.620	-0.076	-0.076	0.945	0.945
Diff: Any Risk Pooling Treatment Minus Any Costly Program Treatment	-0.363*** (0.075) [p<0.001]	-0.355*** (0.067) [p<0.001]	-0.247*** (0.071) [p<0.001]	-0.239*** (0.066) [p<0.001]	-0.281*** (0.072) [p<0.001]	-0.272*** (0.069) [p<0.001]	-0.164*** (0.054) [p=0.002]	-0.151*** (0.053) [p=0.004]
Observations	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231
Adjusted R ²	0.018	0.234	0.009	0.175	0.011	0.125	0.007	0.082

Source: 2016 CCES team module, post-election wave

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing each outcome variable on binary treatment indicators, without and with covariates. The omitted reference category is the control group. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Pre-treatment covariates included in the covariate adjusted model include age, gender, party identification, ideology, voter registration status, education, race, Hispanic origin, marital status, employment status, home ownership status, union member status, union member household status, family income level, and immigrant status.

Table A14: Effect of informational appeals about the SSDI program on other attitudes about SSDI

	DV = Agreement with statement (5-pt scale; -2 strongly disagree to 2 strongly agree)			
	Allow SSDI recipients to exceed monthly income limit		Mandate employers to provide long-term DI at least as generous as SSDI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Among All Subjects				
Risk Pooling	0.176* (0.098)	0.129 (0.099)	-0.029 (0.100)	-0.067 (0.102)
Risk Pooling + Low Abuse Risk	0.114 (0.101)	0.045 (0.102)	-0.168 (0.104)	-0.195* (0.105)
Costly Program	0.060 (0.098)	0.013 (0.098)	0.076 (0.100)	0.033 (0.100)
Costly Program + Lax Eligibility	-0.097 (0.098)	-0.118 (0.098)	0.033 (0.100)	0.027 (0.100)
Constant	-0.114 (0.071)	-0.982* (0.538)	-0.025 (0.072)	1.584*** (0.553)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y
Control Group Mean Outcome	-0.114	-0.114	-0.025	-0.025
Observations	1,231	1,231	1,231	1,231
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.063	0.002	0.051
B. Robustness Check: Among Subjects Who Never Received SSDI Benefits (and who were in both pre- and post-election waves)				
Risk Pooling	0.316*** (0.120)	0.288** (0.124)	-0.069 (0.124)	-0.124 (0.129)
Risk Pooling + Low Abuse Risk	0.256** (0.126)	0.212* (0.129)	-0.155 (0.129)	-0.180 (0.135)
Costly Program	0.078 (0.119)	0.072 (0.121)	0.056 (0.122)	0.010 (0.127)
Costly Program + Lax Eligibility	0.057 (0.120)	0.050 (0.122)	-0.026 (0.123)	-0.027 (0.127)
Constant	-0.256*** (0.086)	-1.423** (0.692)	-0.056 (0.088)	1.252* (0.724)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y
Control Group Mean Outcome	-0.256	-0.256	-0.056	-0.056
Observations	814	814	814	814
Adjusted R ²	0.008	0.057	-0.001	0.016

Source: 2016 CCES team module

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing each outcome variable on binary treatment indicators, without and with covariates. The omitted reference category is the control group. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Pre-treatment covariates included in the covariate adjusted model include age, gender, party identification, ideology, voter registration status, education, race, Hispanic origin, marital status, employment status, home ownership status, union member status, union member household status, family income level, and immigrant status.

Table A15: Effect of any risk pooling appeal or any costly program appeal on SSDI program attitudes, by subject’s party identification

	DV = Agreement with statement (5-pt scale, -2 strongly disagree to 2 strongly agree)							
	Federal gov spends too much on SSDI benefits		Problem if can work but is on SSDI		Non-severe should be ineligible		Encourage work if impairment is less severe	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
With Covariates?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
A. Democrats								
Any Risk Pooling Treatment	-0.220 (0.156)	-0.248 (0.161)	-0.187 (0.163)	-0.082 (0.167)	-0.236 (0.154)	-0.208 (0.167)	-0.133 (0.115)	-0.111 (0.122)
Any Costly Program Treatment	0.167 (0.156)	0.170 (0.159)	-0.032 (0.163)	0.089 (0.165)	0.057 (0.154)	0.050 (0.165)	-0.072 (0.115)	-0.052 (0.121)
Constant	-0.354*** (0.130)	-0.118 (0.584)	0.342** (0.136)	0.933 (0.606)	-0.228* (0.129)	0.087 (0.607)	0.873*** (0.096)	0.859* (0.445)
Control Group Mean Outcome	-0.354	-0.354	0.342	0.342	-0.228	-0.228	0.873	0.873
Diff: Any Risk Pooling Treatment Minus Any Costly Program Treatment	-0.387*** (0.122) [p=0.002]	-0.418*** (0.121) [p<0.001]	-0.155 (0.127) [p=0.223]	-0.171 (0.126) [p=0.175]	-0.293** (0.120) [p=0.015]	-0.258** (0.126) [p=0.041]	-0.061 (0.089) [p=0.497]	-0.059 (0.092) [p=0.521]
Observations	441	441	441	441	441	441	441	441
Adjusted R ²	0.018	0.136	0.0001	0.128	0.010	0.038	-0.001	0.051
B. Independents								
Any Risk Pooling Treatment	-0.294** (0.146)	-0.202 (0.143)	-0.161 (0.139)	-0.026 (0.141)	-0.106 (0.142)	-0.069 (0.148)	-0.205* (0.114)	-0.128 (0.113)
Any Costly Program Treatment	-0.015 (0.143)	0.016 (0.136)	0.092 (0.136)	0.239* (0.134)	0.111 (0.139)	0.123 (0.141)	-0.030 (0.111)	0.024 (0.108)
Constant	0.272** (0.119)	-0.383 (0.783)	0.576*** (0.112)	0.572 (0.772)	-0.076 (0.115)	-0.626 (0.809)	1.000*** (0.092)	0.568 (0.620)
Control Group Mean Outcome	0.272	0.272	0.576	0.576	-0.076	-0.076	1.000	1.000
Diff: Any Risk Pooling Treatment Minus Any Costly Program Treatment	-0.279** (0.118) [p=0.018]	-0.218* (0.112) [p=0.053]	-0.254** (0.112) [p=0.023]	-0.265** (0.111) [p=0.017]	-0.217* (0.114) [p=0.058]	-0.192* (0.116) [p=0.100]	-0.174* (0.091) [p=0.057]	-0.151* (0.089) [p=0.090]
Observations	467	467	467	467	467	467	467	467
Adjusted R ²	0.010	0.202	0.007	0.134	0.003	0.088	0.006	0.167
C. Republicans								
Any Risk Pooling Treatment	-0.101 (0.162)	-0.182 (0.163)	-0.138 (0.128)	-0.164 (0.136)	-0.008 (0.168)	-0.073 (0.172)	-0.069 (0.120)	-0.181 (0.126)
Any Costly Program Treatment	0.286* (0.159)	0.185 (0.160)	0.185 (0.126)	0.134 (0.134)	0.316* (0.165)	0.224 (0.169)	0.208* (0.118)	0.140 (0.124)
Constant	0.470*** (0.131)	0.659 (1.585)	1.015*** (0.103)	1.869 (1.327)	0.106 (0.135)	1.027 (1.674)	0.955*** (0.097)	0.038 (1.229)
Control Group Mean Outcome	0.470	0.470	1.015	1.015	0.106	0.106	0.955	0.955
Diff: Any Risk Pooling Treatment Minus Any Costly Program Treatment	-0.387*** (0.132) [p=0.004]	-0.368*** (0.133) [p=0.006]	-0.323*** (0.105) [p=0.002]	-0.298*** (0.111) [p=0.008]	-0.324** (0.137) [p=0.019]	-0.297** (0.140) [p=0.035]	-0.278*** (0.098) [p=0.005]	-0.321*** (0.103) [p=0.002]
Observations	323	323	323	323	323	323	323	323
Adjusted R ²	0.021	0.177	0.023	0.081	0.014	0.137	0.020	0.097

Source: 2016 CCES team module, post-election wave

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The table reports coefficients from an ordinary least squares model regressing each outcome variable on binary treatment indicators, without and with covariates. The omitted reference category is the control group. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Pre-treatment covariates included in the covariate adjusted model include age, gender, ideology, voter registration status, education, race, Hispanic origin, marital status, employment status, home ownership status, union member status, union member household status, family income level, and immigrant status.

F PERCEPTIONS OF THE COMPOSITION OF PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES (2019 LUCID SURVEY)

F.1 Survey Items

Show all respondents the SSDI block. Randomly assign each respondent to see one of the other three blocks (TANF, Medicaid, or Social Security) with equal probability. Randomize the order of the two blocks.

SSDI Block

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is a federal program that pays benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition expected to last at least one year or result in death. The program requires benefit recipients to have paid Social Security payroll taxes for a certain number of years and to earn below a monthly income threshold.

Which of the following statements are true? Check all that apply. *[Randomize response option order]*

- SSDI beneficiaries must have previously worked and paid payroll taxes
- SSDI beneficiaries do not need to have previously worked

What percent of SSDI beneficiaries do you think are Black or African American?

(For your reference, about 13% of the U.S. population is Black or African American)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of SSDI beneficiaries do you think are women?

(For your reference, about 51% of the U.S. population is women)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of SSDI beneficiaries do you think were born in the United States?

(For your reference, about 87% of the U.S. population was born in the United States)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

TANF Block

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is a federal program that provides cash assistance to poor families. Benefits have a maximum limit of two consecutive years and five years over one's lifetime. The program also requires all recipients to find work within two years of receiving aid, where failure to comply with work requirements could result in loss of benefits.

Which of the following statements are true? Check all that apply. *[Randomize response option order]*

- TANF recipients can collect benefits for up to ten years
- TANF provides cash assistance to poor families

What percent of TANF beneficiaries do you think are Black or African American?

(For your reference, about 13% of the U.S. population is Black or African American)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of TANF beneficiaries do you think are women?

(For your reference, about 51% of the U.S. population is women)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of TANF beneficiaries do you think were born in the United States?

(For your reference, about 87% of the U.S. population was born in the United States)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

Medicaid Block

Medicaid is a federal and state program that helps with medical costs for some low-income people in the United States. Beneficiaries must be U.S. citizens or qualified non-citizens with income up to 133% of the poverty line and may include low-income adults, their children, and people with certain disabilities

Which of the following statements are true? Check all that apply. *[Randomize response option order]*

- Medicaid is a program that provides health care to people over the age of 65 when they retire
- Medicaid beneficiaries include low-income adults

What percent of Medicaid beneficiaries do you think are Black or African American?

(For your reference, about 13% of the U.S. population is Black or African American)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of Medicaid beneficiaries do you think are women?

(For your reference, about 51% of the U.S. population is women)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of Medicaid beneficiaries do you think were born in the United States?

(For your reference, about 87% of the U.S. population was born in the United States)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

Social Security Block

Social Security is a federal program paying benefits to retired workers and their families, survivors of deceased workers, and disabled workers and their families. The program is financed by current workers' payroll taxes, which fund monthly payments to current beneficiaries.

Which of the following statements are true? Check all that apply. *[Randomize response option order]*

- Survivors of deceased workers can receive Social Security benefits

- Social Security is financed by property taxes

What percent of Social Security beneficiaries do you think are Black or African American?

(For your reference, about 13% of the U.S. population is Black or African American)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of Social Security beneficiaries do you think are women?

(For your reference, about 51% of the U.S. population is women)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

What percent of Social Security beneficiaries do you think were born in the United States?

(For your reference, about 87% of the U.S. population was born in the United States)

Please enter a number between 0 and 100.

F.2 Restricting Sample to Respondents Passing Attention Check Items

Figure A4: Perceptions of the Percent of Program Beneficiaries with Given Traits, by Respondent Partisanship. The sample is restricted to respondents who correctly answered attention check questions assessing whether they read and understood the description of the programs they evaluated. Distributions are shown for different combinations of programs (rows) and traits (columns). The dotted line shows the percent of the U.S. population with the given trait; this information was provided to all respondents. Provided base rates are 13% Black/African American, 51% Women, and 87% U.S. Born.




Figure A5: Modal Perception of the Percent of Program Beneficiaries with Given Traits, by Respondent Partisanship. The sample is restricted to respondents who correctly answered attention check questions assessing whether they read and understood the description of the programs they evaluated. Distributions are shown for different combinations of programs (rows) and traits (columns). The dotted line shows the percent of the U.S. population with the given trait; this information was provided to all respondents. Provided base rates are 13% Black/African American, 51% Women, and 87% U.S. Born.



Table A16: Partisan Differences in the Perceived Percent of Beneficiaries with a Given Trait (Sample Restricted to Respondents Passing Attention Check Items Assessing Understanding of Program Description)

	SSDI (1)	TANF (2)	Social Security (3)	Medicaid (4)
I. Outcome: Perceived Pct. of Beneficiaries Who Are Black/AfAm				
Independent	-1.167 (2.046)	-3.135 (4.094)	-2.396 (3.827)	5.667 (3.869)
Republican	3.643** (1.713)	10.096*** (3.561)	4.501 (3.047)	8.565*** (3.232)
Constant	23.565*** (1.130)	32.620*** (2.408)	23.373*** (1.947)	24.000*** (2.139)
Observations	786	287	257	242
R ²	0.008	0.042	0.014	0.030
II. Outcome: Perceived Pct. of Beneficiaries Who Are Women				
Independent	0.841 (1.814)	-5.860* (3.501)	-1.263 (3.254)	5.965* (3.426)
Republican	0.587 (1.518)	-3.431 (3.045)	0.036 (2.590)	7.451*** (2.862)
Constant	36.621*** (1.001)	52.579*** (2.059)	40.286*** (1.655)	39.972*** (1.894)
Observations	786	287	257	242
R ²	0.0003	0.011	0.001	0.030
III. Outcome: Perceived Pct. of Beneficiaries Who Are U.S. Born				
Independent	-3.987 (2.462)	-4.799 (3.908)	3.778 (4.135)	-9.071** (4.339)
Republican	-4.654** (2.060)	-10.915*** (3.398)	-3.229 (3.292)	-0.709 (3.625)
Constant	68.705*** (1.359)	67.612*** (2.298)	70.540*** (2.104)	67.862*** (2.399)
Observations	786	287	257	242
R ²	0.007	0.035	0.010	0.019

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cells report unadjusted OLS regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference group is defined as subjects who identify as Democrats. The sample is restricted to respondents who correctly answered attention check questions assessing whether they read and understood the description of the programs they evaluated.

F.3 No Sample Restrictions

Figure A6: Perceptions of the Percent of Program Beneficiaries with Given Traits, by Respondent Partisanship (No Sample Restrictions). Distributions are shown for different combinations of programs (rows) and traits (columns). The dotted line shows the percent of the U.S. population with the given trait; this information was provided to all respondents.




Table A17: Partisan Differences in the Perceived Percent of Beneficiaries with a Given Trait (No Sample Restrictions)

	SSDI (1)	TANF (2)	Social Security (3)	Medicaid (4)
I. Outcome: Perceived Pct. of Beneficiaries Who Are Black/AfAm				
Independent	-0.875 (1.741)	-3.383 (3.290)	-3.346 (3.109)	4.645 (3.164)
Republican	1.443 (1.443)	7.926*** (2.840)	1.565 (2.426)	3.672 (2.663)
Constant	26.629*** (0.949)	32.360*** (1.842)	25.859*** (1.598)	28.082*** (1.771)
Observations	1,282	430	438	414
R ²	0.001	0.029	0.005	0.007
II. Outcome: Perceived Pct. of Beneficiaries Who Are Women				
Independent	-0.124 (1.512)	-2.744 (2.915)	-3.941 (2.647)	3.142 (2.702)
Republican	-0.083 (1.251)	-1.621 (2.517)	-1.579 (2.066)	0.770 (2.274)
Constant	37.517*** (0.822)	50.244*** (1.632)	41.224*** (1.363)	42.799*** (1.512)
Observations	1,282	430	437	414
R ²	0.00001	0.002	0.005	0.003
III. Outcome: Perceived Pct. of Beneficiaries Who Are U.S. Born				
Independent	-4.780** (2.008)	-3.702 (3.259)	-0.051 (3.437)	-8.851** (3.445)
Republican	-4.476*** (1.662)	-8.223*** (2.814)	-5.148* (2.682)	-2.858 (2.900)
Constant	66.740*** (1.092)	65.391*** (1.825)	68.388*** (1.767)	67.125*** (1.929)
Observations	1,282	430	438	414
R ²	0.007	0.020	0.009	0.016

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cells report unadjusted OLS regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference group is defined as subjects who identify as Democrats.

G AUGMENTED VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT (2019 LUCID SURVEY)

G.1 Treatment Script


Michael is a 34-year old [RANDOMIZE: African American / white] male who previously attended two years of college but did not graduate. He had been consistently working and making a living since he was 16, but in the last year he [RANDOMIZE: was injured on the job / suffered a stroke that led him to becoming intellectually disabled / was diagnosed with a mood disorder] and stopped working. Following the diagnosis, with the help of a legal aid attorney, he applied for and was approved to receive monthly disability benefits from the SSDI program.

Do you agree or disagree with the government's decision to allow Michael to collect SSDI benefit payments?

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

G.2 Average Treatment Effects

Figure A7: Average Treatment Effects of Recipient Impairments (left) and of Recipient Race (right) on Perceived Deservingness of SSDI Recipient. The figure presents treatment effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals.



G.3 Average Recipient Impairment Effects, by Subject's Party

Figure A8: Mean Deservingness Perceptions by Recipient Diagnosis and Subject's Party




Table A18: Recipient Diagnosis Effects on Perceived Deservingness, by Subject's Party

	DV: Agrees Recipient Should Receive SSDI		
	Dem	Ind	Rep
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mood disorder	-0.392*** (0.116)	-0.172 (0.187)	-0.674*** (0.136)
Stroke	0.188* (0.111)	0.014 (0.178)	0.110 (0.137)
Constant	0.986*** (0.077)	0.761*** (0.126)	0.756*** (0.100)
Observations	587	250	450

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cells report unadjusted OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the condition where the recipient's diagnosis is being injured on the job.

G.4 Average Recipient Race Effects, by Subject's Party

Figure A9: Mean Deservingness Perceptions by Recipient Race and Subject's Party




Table A19: Recipient Race Effects on Perceived Deservingness, by Subject's Party

DV: Agrees Recipient Should Receive SSDI			
	Dem (1)	Ind (2)	Rep (3)
African American	-0.035 (0.095)	0.163 (0.149)	-0.212* (0.114)
Constant	0.955*** (0.068)	0.635*** (0.105)	0.661*** (0.080)
Observations	587	250	450

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Cells report unadjusted OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The omitted reference category is the condition where the recipient is white.